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Abstract  
 
An Abstract of a Dissertation Submitted to Nova Southeastern University in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
User Information Security Behavior in Professional Virtual Communities: A Technology 
Threat Avoidance Approach 
 
by 
Vivienne V. Forrester 
April 2019 
 
The popularization of professional virtual communities (PVCs) as a platform for people 
to share experiences and knowledge has produced a paradox of convenience versus 
security. The desire to communicate results in disclosure where users experience ongoing 
professional and social interaction. Excessive disclosure and unsecured user security 
behavior in PVCs increase users’ vulnerability to technology threats. Nefarious entities 
frequently use PVCs such as LinkedIn to launch digital attacks. Hence, users are faced 
with a gamut of technology threats that may cause harm to professional and personal 
lives. Few studies, however, have examined users’ information security behavior and 
their motivation to engage in technology threat avoidance behavior in a PVC.  
 
This study tested a professional virtual community technology threat avoidance model 
empirically. The model was developed from the conceptualization of different aspects of 
the technology threat avoidance theory, social cognitive theory, and involvement theory 
through an integrated approach. This quantitative study employed a random sampling 
methodology. Prior to collecting data for the main study an expert panel review and a 
pilot study were conducted. A web-based survey designed with a 5-point Likert scale was 
distributed to 1285 LinkedIn members to gather self-reported data on users’ technology 
threat avoidance behavior. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation 
modeling (SEM) were used to analyze the data gathered from 380 respondents. 
 
The results of the data analysis revealed that perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, 
and information security knowledge sharing are strong predictors of avoidance 
motivation. Information security knowledge sharing had the most significant predicting 
effect on avoidance motivation in PVCs. Also, self-efficacy, group norms, and avoidance 
motivation all have a significant predicting effect on users’ information security 
avoidance behavior in PVCs. However, information security experience and safeguarding 
measure cost do not have a significant predicting effect on users’ information security 
avoidance motivation. This study makes significant contributions to the IS body of 
knowledge and has implications for practitioners and academics. This study offers a 
comprehensive model through the integration of behavioral and cognitive theories to 
better understand user information security behavior in PVCs. The model also identifies 
essential elements to motivate users to engage in technology threat avoidance behavior. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
Background 
 Virtual communities (VCs) have received increasing attention as a rising 
phenomenon among online users in recent years. Technological advancements in Web 
2.0 platforms have contributed to the transformation of online users from passive readers 
into content contributors. Users now form and reveal their identity in the digital world, as 
they create, distribute, redistribute, and exchange information (Gritzalis, Kandias, 
Stavrou, & Mitrou, 2014). Also, with the increased virtualization of organizations, work 
has transcended physical boundaries as employees can work from virtual offices 
(Arachchilage & Love, 2014).  
 Hagel and Armstrong (1997, p. 143) defined VCs as “computer-mediated spaces 
where there is a potential for the integration of content and communication with an 
emphasis on member-generated content.” A professional virtual community (PVC) refers 
to a human-centric entity, which has been designed to maximize the realization of 
knowledge workers and to best support innovation within a virtual environment (Bifulco, 
& Santoro, 2005). Dudezert, Heibült, and Boughzala (2006) asserted that PVCs provide a 
context for professionals to share their knowledge and build skills without geographical 
constraints. Hence, PVCs are constant online spaces, where users experience ongoing 
professional and social interaction (Søraker, 2011). As a continuous online space, the use 
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of PVCs for business and social activities has become a fundamental element of financial 
growth and opportunity (Prieger, 2013; Shillair et al., 2015).  
 However, along with the conveniences of using computers and the internet, users 
are faced with a gamut of technology threats. Users experience threats associated with a 
data breach, malware, ransomware, identify theft, and phishing attacks, which may cause 
severe harm to professional and personal lives (Microsoft, 2014; Rainie Kiesler, Kang, & 
Madden, 2013). According to the Symantec (2017) Internet security threat report, 
ransomware spiraled worldwide in 2016, with 100 new malware families released and a 
36% increase in ransomware attacks. The growth in technology threats has resulted in an 
increased need for users to undertake technology threat avoidance behaviors. 
Nevertheless, while internet users may use basic, built-in system security settings such as 
antivirus software, firewall, and automatic updates to maintain their security, three in five 
people believe they cannot be completely anonymous online and are increasingly worried 
about privacy (Rainie et al., 2013). A user’s sense of safety and security is critical in 
PVCs as users are expected to share information.  
 PVCs increase the flow of information on a platform designed for creating, 
sharing and transferring knowledge, as users become addicted to sharing their personal 
information to a broader range of friends (Zhao et al., 2012). However, this “free-flow” 
sharing of information is sometimes detrimental to the users (Hung & Cheng, 2013). As a 
result, Zhang and Gupta (2016, p. 2) indicated that user-generated content ecosystem in 
VCs often “suffers from data interception, information fraudulence, privacy spying, and 
copyright infringement from disorganized social, organizational forms and non-friendly 
participation bodies.”   
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  Furthermore, the rapid growth in popularity of PVC has attracted the unwanted 
attention of both hackers and organized crime. While hackers create havoc, 
cybercriminals exploit PVC using them for fraud and other illegal activities, including 
data mining and spear phishing. At a recent DefCon security conference, a group of 
social engineering hackers attempted to trick employees from more than a dozen major 
corporations including Apple, AT&T, and United Airlines into disclosing sensitive 
corporate information on LinkedIn (Crowley, 2012). Some people divulged specific 
technical details about their employer’s infrastructure, while others revealed information 
that could be used for stealth attacks. Security is a significant concern and is of utmost 
importance as LinkedIn has over 500 million registered users globally. LinkedIn is a 
professional virtual community, offering business and employment-oriented service to its 
users. As a website and mobile app operated service, LinkedIn provides a platform where 
employers post jobs and job seekers post their resumes, search for jobs, find connections, 
and make and receive recommendations from other users. LinkedIn provides information 
on approximately 10 million careers and 9 million companies, in over 200 
countries (Darrow, 2017).  
 Different from other social networks such as Instagram, Facebook, and Snapchat 
that is more recreational, LinkedIn emphasizes a user’s professional connection. Users 
create profile pages structured like a resume, recapitulate their career, promote their 
skills, their education, and employment history (Zide, Elman, & Shahani-Denning, 2014). 
LinkedIn user-connection structure employs a "gated-access approach” where building 
connections require an existing relationship or an introduction through a current contact. 
This approach is envisioned to build trust among members. However, while users are 
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generously providing data via user profiles, they are faced with a paradox of increasing 
security risk to their data. Since 2015, LinkedIn generates most of its revenue from 
recruitment services, selling access to members information to professional recruiters and 
employers (Ara & Ara, 2015; Lemann, 2015). LinkedIn has also been criticized for not 
taking appropriate measures to secure users’ information (Paul, 2012). 
 
Problem Statement 
 Professional virtual communities (PVC) are targets for cyber attacks. Specifically, 
nefarious entities frequently use LinkedIn to launch digital attacks. Nevertheless, users 
continue to participate in unsafe computing practices in VCs (Microsoft, 2014). Several 
studies have investigated user information security behavior towards security threats. 
However, previous studies focused more on understanding the home computer usage and 
compliance in organizations and their associated security risks (Arachchilage & Love, 
2014; Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Li & Siponen, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010). 
While in general information security threats in social media is acknowledged, the 
literature is lacking in studies that consider security threats targeted to PVCs. This study 
is an attempt to fill the gap in the information security (IS) literature by investigating user 
security behavior in PVCs and how to motivate individual users to engage in technology 
threats avoidance behavior, through an integrated approach. 
 This study was motivated by a growth in the popularity of PVCs, particularly, 
LinkedIn and the rising number of security threats in recent years. According to Huh, 
Kim, Rayala, Bobba, and Beznosov (2017) most of today’s IS attacks are not concerned 
with only circumventing the authentication process of an individual (as in the case of 
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home computer usage) or even an organization, they are more inclined to access 
confidential information on a larger scale, such as through a PVC. Also, social media 
differs in its functionality and architecture. The LinkedIn community focuses on 
professional, work-related life (Utz, 2016). Samtani, Chinn, Chen, and Nunamaker 
(2017) pointed out that PVCs present unique security threats and are considered “gold 
mines” for hackers, as they have a considerable amount of confidential and strategic 
information that spans many organizations in a single location. Huh, et al. (2017) also 
indicated that beyond and above other social media such as Facebook and Twitter, 
LinkedIn has vital information that bad actors can use to attack nearly any organization 
and its corporate data in over two hundred countries. These scenarios highlight the 
importance of examining user information security behavior in PVCs, primarily due to 
the potential wide-scale repercussions to individuals, organizations, and even countries, 
that may result from a lack of user security actions in PVCs. Furthermore, Zhang and 
Gupta (2016) indicated that the security and trustworthiness issues of PVCs have become 
increasingly severe and issued a call for urgent research and attention to the phenomena.  
 
Dissertation Goal  
 The goal of this study was to investigate the avoidance motivation factors that 
influence users’ information security behavior in professional virtual communities. To 
address the lack of research on user security behaviors in PVCs from both a personal 
and collaborative approach, this study integrated constructs from the involvement theory 
and social cognitive theory into the threat avoidance theory to explain user information 
security behavior in PVCs. This study developed a conceptual model to investigate how 
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individual computer users in professional virtual communities avoid technology threats in 
an integrated approach based on constructs from the technology threat avoidance theory 
(TTAT), involvement theory, and social cognitive theory (SCT).  
 Drawing on the involvement theory (Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2004), this study examined 
how personal experiences with security threats, privacy breaches, and coping measures, 
coupled with sharing of security knowledge within professional virtual communities can 
enhance users’ self-confidence to engage in technology threat avoidance behavior 
ultimately. The study contributes to knowledge on computers and security by proposing 
an integrated theoretical information security user model which identifies predictors of 
users’ information security behavior in PVCs.   
 
Research Questions 
 This study addressed the following research questions: 
1. How do factors from technology threat avoidance theory and involvement theory 
predict individual computer users’ technology threat avoidance motivation in 
professional virtual communities? 
2. How do self-efficacy, “group norms,” and avoidance motivation safeguards 
predict users’ avoidance security behavior in professional virtual communities?  
 
Relevance and Significance 
There has been a continuous request for research on user information security 
behaviors (Crossler et al., 2013; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). There is an increased 
number of studies that have focused on examining users’ intention to perform 
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information security behaviors (e.g., (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Herath & Rao, 
2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lee et al., 2008; Vance et al., 2012)) within recent 
years. However, there is a gap in the field that requires attention. There is a lack of 
research that investigates the emerging security threats in PVCs and users’ information 
security behavior towards the associated threats, especially as an integrated approach. 
The increasing use of PVCs and adoption of online user policies suggest that even 
security mistakes in a PVC may affect other public places’ online safety. The lack of 
security action of an individual can cause other members of the PVC as well as several 
organizations to face cyber-threats (Tsi et al., 2016). Hence, it is imperative to address 
technology threat avoidance from both a personal and collaborative approach.  
Additionally, the extant literature on professional virtual communities focuses on 
knowledge sharing, eLearning, or health practices. Also, several studies focused on basic 
security threats in home computers and organizations. For instance, Dang-Pham and 
Pittayachawan (2015) investigated the factors that contributed to malware avoidance 
behaviors of security threats in multiple contexts and compared the impact of behavioral 
intentions specifically in mobile devices at home and in a BYOD enabled institution. 
They found that behavioral intention to execute malware avoidance behaviors varies 
across the contexts. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) also found that perceptions of 
self-efficacy and vulnerability have different impacts on malware avoidance.  
Additionally, Crossler, Bélanger, and Ormond (2017) indicated that online 
security threats must be examined from a holistic approach to include adopting multiple 
actions for self-protection. As the characteristics and security threats associated with 
PVCs are different from home computer usages and organizations, it is critical to 
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understand the diverse approach that is necessary for user information security behavior 
in PVCs.  
 Moreover, according to Zheleva and Getoor (2009) to address privacy concerns 
and to prevent personal information leakage, users must be cognizant of the methods an 
adversary can use to attack a VC to gain access to users’ private attributes. Prior 
experience with technology threat avoidance theory, involvement theory, and social 
cognitive theory have not been previously considered as a comprehensive framework for 
individual computer users’ technology threat avoidance. This study contributes to 
research on computers and security by examining technology threat avoidance behavior 
from both a personal and collaborative approach through an integrated model. The model 
(PVCTTAM) integrated new motivational factors for technology threat avoidance: 
information security knowledge sharing and information security experience, with group 
norms into the TTAT model to examine the cognitive coping processes as users engage in 
technology threat avoidance behavior in protecting against technology threats in PVCs. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
This study used a web-based survey approach to collect quantitative data from 
respondents who are adult members of the LinkedIn professional virtual community. 
Critical barriers in this approach include achieving the target sample size, the willingness 
of target respondents to participate in the study, and the generalizability of the study. 
Acquiring a suitable sample for a study can be challenging. Hence, the target respondents 
were identified through professional connections, professional networks, and LinkedIn. 
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Respondents were also encouraged to share the survey with their professional networks, 
using the social media share icons embedded on the thank-you page. 
The participants were selected randomly from the population of LinkedIn 
members. This method provides a better representation of the target population than 
using a convenient sample (Son & Kim, 2008). Additionally, examining security 
behavior in a community can be difficult, as security concerns may vary from individual 
or professional group to another. Furthermore, this study focusses on LinkedIn individual 
users as participants. Hence some aspects of the study may not apply to other social 
network users.  
 
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations  
 The primary statistical methods used to analyze the results and to assess the 
reliability and validity of the study include a multivariate statistical method of 
Cronbach’s Alpha, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and structural equation modeling 
(SEM). Therefore, the assumptions and limitations of these approaches also apply to this 
research. SEM maintains several assumptions which should be met to guarantee reliable 
results. These assumptions include reasonable sample size, continuously and normally 
distributed endogenous variables, model identification of known correlations or 
covariances input, complete data, and theoretical basis for model specification and 
causality (Kline, 2012). 
 The survey explores user information security behavior. Many of the measures, 
including perceived susceptibility and perceived severity, are not detectable from 
behavioral data such as server logs. Instead, the primary data collected for this study is 
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self-reported data, which may be subjected to common method bias. However, the single-
factor common method tests indicate that the common method bias does not pose a threat 
to the findings of this study(Podsakoff et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
actual behaviors are challenging to study in the security context (Vroom & von Solms, 
2004).  
 However, based on behavioral theories such as theory of planned behavior (TBA) 
and theory of reasoned action (TRA), there is a consistent and robust relationship 
between intentions and actual behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003) as illustrated in Sheeran’s 
(2002) correlational tests of intention-behavior consistency, as well as meta-analytic tests 
conducted based on experimental studies examining the impact of changing subject. The 
survey was administered to a subset of LinkedIn members. The sample demographics 
was a close representation of the population of LinkedIn members; hence, this study 
serves as an adequate representation of professional virtual community users. 
 
Summary  
Human beings “distinctive genius” rely on communication with others. This 
inherent desire to communicate often takes the form of disclosure (Millham & Atkins, 
2018). Technological advancements in Web 2.0 interactive tools have contributed to the 
transformation of professional virtual communities (PVC). PVCs provide a platform for 
individuals to share experiences and knowledge (Zhao, Lu, Wang, Chau, & Zhang, 
2012). As, a result, PVCs such as LinkedIn have continued to increase in both popularity 
and influence. However, as the usage of the Internet and PVCs increases, the security and 
privacy risks to users have also increased. Based on the behavioral theories including 
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technology threat avoidance theory, social cognitive theory, and involvement theory, this 
research focusses on the potential of professional virtual communities (PVC) to disrupt 
existing privacy and security boundaries while encouraging and facilitating information 
sharing among community members.  
Based on the security risks and the increased use of PVCs, it is essential to 
examine how individuals with high regards for their personal information choose to 
disclose specific credentials publicly. To provide a clear understanding of PVC user 
information security threat avoidance behaviors, it is useful to explore the security 
elements that affect personal sharing, the role of the user information security knowledge 
and experience in relation to technology threat avoidance behavior in PVCs, and the 
avoidance motivation factors that influence users’ technology threat avoidance behavior 
in PVCs. This study drew on the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT), 
involvement theory, and the social cognitive theory (SCT), to explain how personal 
experiences with privacy breaches, security threats, and coping measures can enhance 
users’ self-confidence to engage in technology threat avoidance behavior ultimately. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
Overview  
This study focuses on PVC users’ ability and willingness to adopt avoidance 
motivation and ultimately avoidance behavior for implementing computer security 
measures to protect their accounts. A key issue of professional virtual community users is 
understanding information security and how to attain a reasonable level of security for 
their LinkedIn account. As technologies like the web, the cloud, and specifically PVCs 
become more integrated into standard social and business practices; concerns are 
increasing that data breaches are occurring more frequently. Herath and Rao (2009) 
indicated that users view policies, particularly those involving information security as 
mere guidelines or general directions to follow rather than hard and fast rules that require 
compliance. Therefore, enforcement of security in PVCs is challenging. As a result, many 
PVC users continue to experience multiple security attacks. Pesce, Casas, Rauber, and 
Almeida (2012) reported that exposure of date and place of birth of a PVC user’s profile 
could be used to predict the social security number (SSN) of a United States citizen, 
potentially leading to identity theft.  
 As the advancement of PVC translates to economic opportunities, the importance 
of information will also increase. Understanding user information security behavior and 
developing security protection models will assist PVC users in strengthening information 
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security through tools and methods. This study will develop a model, the professional 
virtual community technology threat avoidance model, grounded in the technology threat 
avoidance theory, involvement theory, and social cognitive theory.   
Technology threat avoidance theory embedded in cybernetic theory and 
represented by a cybernetic process is a broad-based theory that explains why and how 
individual IT users engage in threat avoidance behaviors. This study employed the TTAT 
as a framework to provide a basis for PVC users motivation and avoidance behavior in 
adopting security safeguarding measures. The involvement theory rooted in marketing 
and education examines the impacts of user security knowledge sharing and experiences 
on PVC user’s motivation to adopt security measures. The social cognitive theory is 
grounded in psychology. Bandua (1986) developed SCT to understand and predict both 
individual and group behavior and to identify how to amend or change behavior. The 
study employed SCT to examine how group norms as a concept of observational learning 
influence PVC user’s information security behavior.  
 
Theory Development  
Based on the existing literature, there is a discrepancy between individual 
computer users realizing that there is a technology threat and how and when users adopt 
avoidance motivation actions against such a threat. Also, the gap between the avoidance 
motivation factors which influence users’ information security avoidance behavior and 
actual users’ information security avoidance behavior in PVCs is not adequately 
explained by the existing literature. The researcher will attempt to close this gap in the 
14 
 
 
 
information systems and information security literature by developing the professional 
virtual community technology threat avoidance model (PVCTTAM).  
The proposed conceptual model uses technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT), 
involvement theory, and the social cognitive theory (SCT) to understand what motivates 
online safety behaviors in the context of PVCs. Individual computer users do not have 
formal organizational compliance security controls (Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 
2014). Hence, other methods of controls are needed for their threat avoidance behavior. 
Prior research suggested the development of a community of practice, knowledge 
sharing, and repeated training and security awareness to build users’ confidence in their 
abilities to manage technology threats (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015).  
This study, therefore, integrated the construct of group norms, knowledge sharing 
and, experience with safeguarding measure cost, self-efficacy, perceived susceptibility, 
and perceived severity into the TTAT model to further examine cognitive and 
collaborative strategies that can motivate individual users to engage in technology threat 
avoidance behaviors in virtual communities. The researcher extended these dimensions of 
the three theories in the context of information security. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed 
conceptual model. 
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Figure 1: Professional virtual community technology threat avoidance model 
(PVCTTAM) 
 
Approaches to Avoidance Motivation and Behavior Avoidance  
Avoidance motivation is defined as “the degree to which IT users are motivated to 
avoid IT threats by taking safeguarding measures (Liang & Xue, 2009, p. 84). One of the 
barriers to avoidance motivation is the complexities of protective behavior and practices 
(Hoban, Rader, Wash, & Vaniea, 2014). According to Zheleva and Getoor (2009) to 
address privacy concerns and to prevent personal information leakage, users must be 
cognizant of the methods an adversary can use to attack a PVC to gain access to users’ 
private attributes. Motivation behavior is influenced by safeguarding measure cost, which 
is payback for engaging in motivation behavior, including physical and cognitive efforts 
such as time, money, and understanding to use security protection measures (Liang & 
Xue, 2009; Weinstein, 1993). These efforts often create behavioral barriers and reduce 
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the motivation to engage in information security avoidance behavior due to the cost-
benefit analysis. If the costs to mitigate the threat are perceived to be high in comparison 
to the benefits, individuals are less likely to adopt security avoidance behavior. Hence, 
the higher the safeguarding cost to protect from technology threats, the less likely users 
will engage in avoidance motivation, therefore the hypothesis:  
H1: Safeguarding measure cost to protect against technology threats is negatively 
related to avoidance motivation. 
Liang and Xue (2010, p. 397) defined perceived susceptibility as an “individual’s 
subjective probability that a malicious IT will negatively affect him or her”, while 
perceived severity is defined as “the extent to which an individual perceives that negative 
consequences caused by a malicious IT will be severe” (Liang & Xue, 2010, p. 397). 
Perceived susceptibility and perceived severity are combined to form a perceived threat 
(Witte, 1992), which may influence how users process security threats and how 
motivated they are to engage in a behavior. If perceived susceptibility and perceived 
severity are determined to be high, then a user will engage in a coping mechanism 
(avoidance). According to Ng, Kankanhalli, and Xu (2009), when users are conscious of 
the susceptibility and severity of the malicious threats, they can make informed decisions 
to execute preventative behavior, hence the hypotheses: 
H2: Perceived susceptibility of being attacked by malicious technology threats is 
positively related to avoidance motivation. 
H3: Perceived severity of being attacked by malicious technology threats is 
positively related to avoidance motivation. 
17 
 
 
 
Flores et al. (2014) described information security knowledge sharing as the 
interaction between users by sharing experiences, ideas, and knowledge to safeguard 
information assets. Information security knowledge sharing is an effective method to 
increase the level of awareness, and it is a sign of information security involvement (Safa 
et al., 2016). Arachchilage and Love’s (2014) study indicates that users’ knowledge 
avoids phishing threats. According to Ben-Asher and Gonzalez (2015), information 
knowledge sharing can significantly alleviate the risk of information security threats. 
Information security knowledge sharing also assists in reducing time and resources spent 
on developing appropriate security measures (Feledi et al., 2013) by preventing the 
duplication of the same solutions for similar security threats. Additionally, Safa et al. 
(2016) further highlighted the importance of sharing security knowledge not only to 
increase security awareness, which is a motivating factor for behavior performance 
(Abawajy, 2014) but also reduces the cost of information security in organizations, hence 
the hypothesis:  
H4: Information security knowledge sharing is positively related to users’ 
avoidance motivation.  
Experience is defined as knowledge or mastery, resulting in awareness, ability, 
skill, and understanding of a concept through exposure or involvement. Information 
security experience refers to knowledge of and familiarity with information security 
breaches, skills, and the ability to prevent, manage, and mitigate information security 
risks (Safa et al., 2016). Ashenden (2008) found that experience is an essential aspect of 
information security management. Safa et al. (2016) established that the concept of 
information security knowledge and experience is the central problem for users in 
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information security. They indicated that knowledge and experience assist in generating 
appropriate behavior in dynamic environments, therefore the hypothesis: 
H5: Information security experience is positively related to users’ avoidance 
motivation.  
According to Shillair et al. (2015), studies of employee online safety behaviors 
indicate that social norms are determining factors for online safety practices. Consistent 
with SCT, group norms are indicators of how users will accept responsibility to engage in 
specific behaviors. Dholakia, Bagozzi, and Pearo (2004, p. 245) defined group norms as 
“an understanding of, and a commitment by, the individual member to a set of goals, 
values, beliefs, and conventions shared with other group members.” Dholakia et al. 
(2004) further indicated that Group norms are especially significant for virtual 
communities as they are conceivably the most readily accessible components of group-
related information obtainable in many communities and regulating exchanges among 
members over time (Alon et al., 2004). Ajzen (1991, p. 185) posited that an “individual’s 
perception of acceptable group norms drives the intention to engage in a specific 
behavior.” 
Past studies show that group norms in online communities have powerful and 
consistent influences on members’ attitudes and behaviors (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Terry & 
Hogg, 1996; Zeng, Huang, & Dou, 2009). In the case of online safety, if users believe it 
is the norm for individuals to take responsibility and if they have the confidence to 
perform security protection tasks, they will be more motivated to perform the necessary 
functions (Douba et al., 2014). On the contrary, if users believe it is the group norm to 
rely on external factors such as their ISP, operating system manufacturer, or Internet 
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browser makers, they will be less motivated to perform security protection behavior 
(Shillair et al., 2015), hence the hypothesis: 
H6: Group norms is positively related to technology threat avoidance behavior.   
According to Arachchilage and Love (2014), many internet users are not 
confident in their ability to protect themselves online; this confidence refers to self-
efficacy. In the context of security, Liang and Xue (2010) defined self-efficacy as 
individuals’ confidence in taking safeguarding measures to protect against technology 
threats. Prior studies indicate that individuals are more motivated to engage in technology 
security behavior as their self-efficacy rise (Liang & Xue, 2010; Kaiser, 1974; Ng, 
Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009; Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005). According to Bandura (1989), 
individuals with low self-efficacy are inclined to avoid challenging tasks. These users are 
considered passive users. High self-efficacy individuals are more active problem-solvers, 
as they act from their self-perceived ability to accomplish tasks effectively. Additionally, 
Shillair et al. (2015) suggested that higher self-efficacy increases the likelihood of the 
users engaging in protective behavior, thus the hypothesis: 
H7: Self-efficacy to protect against technology threats is positively related to 
avoidance behavior. 
Avoidance behavior refers to actual behavior (Liang & Xue, 2010). The 
relationship between motivation and action was long established in psychology and 
organization research. According to cognitive theorists (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), behavioral intention is a great predictor of actual 
behavior, and behavior intention is synonymous with avoidance motivation. This concept 
was supported by the law of effect (Thorndike, 1911), which indicates that human beings 
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are motivated to repeat past actions that lead to positive outcomes and reduce past actions 
that produce adverse outcomes. Steers, Mowday, and Shapiro (2004) also found that 
individuals are more likely to act when they are motivated. Consistent with TTAT (Liang 
& Xue, 2009), in the context of IT threat, users’ technology threat avoidance behavior is 
influenced by avoidance motivation. Hence, following previous studies, this study 
predicts that users who have strong avoidance motivation are more likely to engage in 
avoidance behavior against technology threats, therefore the hypothesis: 
H8: Avoidance motivation is positively related to avoidance behavior to protect against 
technology threats using the safeguarding measures.  
 
Theoretical Background  
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
Liang and Xue (2009) developed the technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) 
to explain individual IT user’s threat avoidance behavior. TTAT was developed through a 
synthesis of literature from various disciplines, including psychology, health care, risk 
analysis, and information systems. Grounded in the cybernetic theory (Carver & Scheier, 
1982; Edwards, 1992), TTAT postulates that users’ IT threat avoidance is reflective of a 
closed feedback loop, where users try to extend the gap between their current security 
state and the unsafe end state. The foundation of TTAT is that when users perceive the 
existence of an IT threat, it motivates them to actively avoid the threat by utilizing a 
safeguarding measure (a problem-focused coping measure) if they consider that the 
safeguarding measure can circumvent the threat. However, if the user believes the threat 
is not avoidable by any safeguarding measures accessible to them, they will employ 
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emotion-focused coping measures to passively avoid the threat (Liang & Xue, 2009). 
This process theory view, as illustrated in Figure 2 explains the coping appraisal process. 
The authors developed the process theory view to test TTAT as process research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The process theory view of the TTAT (Liang & Xue, 2009) 
 
Drawing on the research of risk analysis (Baskerville, 1991a; Baskerville, 1991b) 
and health psychology (Janz & Becker, 1984; Rogers, 1983; Weinstein, 2000), TTAT 
also theorizes that the perceived likelihood determines users' threat perceptions that a 
threat will occur and the perceived severity of the threat’s negative consequences (Liang 
& Xue, 2010). The theory elucidates the approach-avoidance discrepancy, signifying that 
the avoidance of a malicious threat is not the same as taking a safeguarding measure. The 
approach-avoidance model assumes that avoidance and adoption behaviors are ultimately 
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different. The authors introduced core constructs to fully comprehend threat appraisal, 
coping appraisal, and coping, as described by the variance theory view in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The variance theory view of TTAT (Liang & Xue, 2009) 
 
 While most theories addressing information security focus is on an organizational 
level, TTAT provides a framework that describes the factors that influence individual 
users’ IT threat avoidance behavior. According to Liang and Wang (2009), TTAT has the 
potential to support IT professionals in raising security awareness to design effective 
mechanisms to educate employees about IT threats. This study focuses on the 
professional virtual community, LinkedIn users’ information security behavior with 
23 
 
 
 
individuals as the unit of analysis and apply TTAT constructs and concepts to develop a 
user information security model to guide PVC users’ security behavior.  
 This study adopted the core constructs of self-efficacy, safeguarding measure 
cost, perceived susceptibility, and perceived severity from the TTAT theory. Consistent 
with TTAT, users’ IT Threat avoidance behavior is determined by avoidance motivation, 
which is influenced by perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, safeguarding measure 
cost, and self-efficacy.  Safeguarding cost is the physical and cognitive efforts, including 
time, money, and inconvenience required to engage in avoidance motivation (Liang & 
Xue, 2009). Self-efficacy refers to users perceived ability to perform a given task 
(Bandura, 2000) in the context of information security, self- efficacy is defined as one’s 
ability to take the appropriate measures to protect self against IT threats effectively (Ling 
& Xue, 2009).  
 The belief that an individual can execute a behavior is an essential construct in IS; 
adopted from social psychology. Several studies indicated that self-efficacy influences an 
individual’s ability to engage in a task in the context of clinical, managerial, and 
computer usage. Self-efficacy beliefs influence decisions about what behaviors to 
undertake (e.g., Bandura, et al., 1977; Betz & Hackett, 1981), computer usage and its 
relationship between self-efficacy computer behaviors (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; 
Campeau & Higgins, 1995), computer game usage (Bergey, Ketelhut, Liang, Natarajan, 
& Karakus (2015) and internet usage (Wang, Jackson, Wang, & Gaskin, 2015). These 
studies argued the need for further research to fully understand the impact of self-efficacy 
on users’ information security behavior in online environments.   
 The TTAT theory is widely used in the IS literature and has demonstrated validity  
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TTAT identifies many of the issues that the professional virtual community framework 
needs to address. The proposed PVC model attempts to develop threat perceptions such 
that PVC users will be more motivated to avoid IT threats and use safeguarding 
measures. A vital aspect of this process is that PVC users comprehend the efficiency of 
safeguarding measures, lower safeguard costs, and increase self-efficacy. However, there 
is a recognition that additional variables are needed to explain user information security 
behavior in virtual communities fully. Hence, this study integrated other variables from 
the social cognitive theory and the involvement theory.  
Involvement Theory 
The involvement theory discusses the amount and level of energy, time, and 
participation spent engaged in an activity (Lee, Lee & Yoo, 2004). Witmer and Singer 
(1998, p. 227) defined involvement as “a psychological state experienced as a 
consequence of focusing one’s energy and attention on a coherent set of stimuli or 
meaningfully related activities and events.” The concept of involvement was initially 
linked to learning, advertising, and consumer behavior. According to Olshavsky and 
Granbois (1979), the average consumer makes several routine decisions daily without an 
all-embracing search for information or comprehensive evaluation of the choice 
alternatives. As a result, theorists began to view consumer behavior as a two-fold 
dichotomy: low involvement consumer behavior and high involvement consumer 
behavior (Engel & Blackwell 1982). Zaichkowsky (1986) further conceptualized 
involvement as having an impact on behavioral decisions and posited that in the 
consumer behavior/marketing domain, involvement is an important factor with purchase 
decisions or the "act" of purchase.  
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The involvement theory evolved and became applicable to online security 
behavior. Flores, Antonsen, and Ekstedt (2014) posited that the lack of security 
awareness or knowledge among users is an indicator of a low level of information 
security involvement. According to Safa et al. (2016), information security knowledge 
sharing represents the level of effort, participation, and time that users engage in security 
activities. Safa et al. (2016) further revealed that the level of effort, participation, and 
time users spend on information security knowledge sharing and building their 
experiences reflect various forms of involvement. Hence, involvement may affect users’ 
attitude to engage in security tasks. 
The involvement theory has garnered significant attention in behavioral 
researches, such as social psychology, marketing, and advertising domains and has been 
applied extensively in student involvement, customer involvement, and product 
involvement (Huang, Chou, & Lin, 2010; Safa et al., 2016). In behavioral consumer 
research, Dholakia (1998) and Poiesz and Cees (1995) argued that involvement plays a 
significant role in moderating and explaining variable relationships, while Zaichkowsky 
(1986) indicated that the extent of involvement impacts a series of behavioral decisions.  
Additionally, the analysis of the involvement conceptual and methodological perspectives 
model (Houston & Rothschild, 1978), the involvement conceptualizing model 
(Zaichkowsky, 1986), and the involvement conceptualizing & measuring model 
(Andrews, Durvasula, & Akhter, 1990) predicted the use of involvement concepts on 
consumer behavior.  
The core constructs of the involvement theory are information security knowledge 
sharing and information security experience. Safa et al. (2016, p. 73) defined information 
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security experience as “the familiarity with information security incidents, skills and the 
ability to prevent, manage, and mitigate the risk of information security events. 
According to Albrechtsen (2007), the lack of information security knowledge is the main 
issue concerning the role of users in information security. Information security 
experience leads to familiarity, mindfulness, understanding, as well as the ability and 
skill to manage incidents (Safa et al., 2015) and create appropriate behavior in the real 
environment. These studies, however, focused on information security experience 
generally to users on the Internet. This study targeted the construct to a PVC which is 
dynamic but also has a level of constancy based on the structure of developing trust 
through membership and connections.  
 Information security knowledge sharing has been noted as a predictor of users’ 
involvement in their security behavior (Flores et al., 2014). Dang-Pham and 
Pittayachawan (2015) also recommended knowledge sharing to build users’ confidence to 
manage technology threats. Kokolakis (2017) in his study on a review of the privacy 
paradox phenomenon, indicates that users’ attitudes and behavior regarding their online 
disclosures, privacy, and security evaluations reveal a multifaceted, symbiotic 
relationship. Millhan and Atkins (2016) posited that disclosure often takes the form of 
knowledge sharing. Knowledge is the understanding of a subject, fact, or information, 
acquired through education or experience (Safa et al., 2016).  
 Therefore, knowledge sharing assists users through collaboration to solve 
problems, develop new ideas, and or establish policies or procedures (Wang & Noe, 
2010). Lee, Lee, and Sanford (2011) indicated that knowledge sharing is essential to 
decision making, risk mitigation, and cost reduction. The complex nature of threat 
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avoidance reduces users’ ability to be fully equipped with the knowledge to perform 
security tasks (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Hui, 2007).  
Social Cognitive Theory 
The social cognitive theory (SCT) is formerly known as the social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1986). SCT originated in the areas of psychology and communication and is a 
generally accepted, empirically validated model for understanding, predicting, and 
modifying human behavior in the context of both individual and groups. SCT postulates 
that human behavior is a dynamic relationship, where cognitive factors and 
environmental influences interact with behavioral factors (Bandura, 1986, 1991, 1997). 
SCT is used in IS to understand user computer behavior (Shillair et al., 2015; Cho, Lee, 
& Chung, 2010; Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008; Yi & 
Im, 2004).  
SCT recognizes the value of learning through experiences (Bandura, 1991). A 
person's beliefs impact the interaction between the person and behavioral factors and 
actions. Hence the person has some amount of control over their actions. The interaction 
between the individual and the environment involves human beliefs and cognition, 
influenced by social constructs and structures within the environment. The interaction 
between the environment and behavior comprises a person selecting their environment 
while their environment alters their behavior. According to Anderson and Agarwal 
(2010), learning through observation and vicarious experiences assists users in building 
confidence and self-efficacy. The SCT schematic diagram in Figure 4 illustrates the 
interaction between the person, environment, and behavior.  
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Figure 4: Schematic diagram of the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) 
  
 Social influence refers to a general view of how others influence an individual's 
behavior in his or her environment (Liang & Xue, 2010). Johnston and Warkentin (2010) 
equate social influences on social norms, a perception of how others are behaving. Social 
norms of a community are operationalized as group norms. Group norms are especially 
significant for PVCs as they are arguably the most available interaction element, such as 
through FAQs or inferable (as in the case of previous interactions) elements of group-
related information available in many communities (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000). This 
concept was supported by Nissenbaum (2009, p. 127) who explained that the norms that 
govern “the flow of personal information in a given context are dependent on the type of 
information being shared, the content of the information, the method of communication, 
as well as the role of the transmitter and the receiver.”  
Prior computer security-related studies examine social influence as a predictor of 
user behavior (Culnan & Williams, 2009; Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012; Lowry & 
Moody, 2015; Posey et al., 2013; Vance et al., 2013). However, many of these studies 
were in the context of organizations. Similarly, subjective norms have been applied to 
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computer security-related studies as a social construct. Subjective norms refer to “an 
individual's perceptions of how others who are important to him or her think he/she 
should behave” (Conner & Armitage, 1998). As the focus of this study is virtual 
communities where users are mainly strangers, social influence in a general sense is more 
appropriate. Hence drawing on the SCT, this study modified the social norm construct to 
make it more relevant to IS PVC context, in the form of group norms. The researcher 
examined group norm as a motivator for technology threat avoidance behavior in a PVC.  
 
Information Security in Professional Virtual Communities 
 Professional virtual communities such as LinkedIn are designed to encourage and 
facilitate information sharing while also having the potential to disrupt existing privacy 
and security boundaries. PVC posting norms often the entity itself, encourage the 
disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) and personal private information 
(PPI) (Zhang & Gupta, 2016). PVCs users are even infrequently willing to forego some 
privacy for a tolerable level of danger, in exchange for a reward (Kumar, Saravanakumar, 
& Deepa, 2016). This type of disclosure poses a considerable risk to the user, threaten 
users’ security and trust over the network, often leading to data breaches and security 
violations (Millham & Atkin, 2016).   
 As Gritzalis, et al. (2014) indicated, a significant feature of the eco-system of 
personal data on PVCs is that the data is available for crawling and analytics, even 
without the users’ consent. According to Yeboah-Boateng (2013), the involuntary 
psychometric evaluations and exposure of personal data can lead to a “critical 
infrastructure,” characterized by a myriad of cyber-security challenges, such as 
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vulnerabilities of confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA). As numerous threat 
agents or hackers exploit vulnerabilities, a crisis in a PVC such as LinkedIn with all the 
data at risk may affect other areas such as national security, economic profitability or 
social well-being (Gritzalis et al., 2014). 
 Information security is often analyzed and managed based on the CIA triad 
(Maconachy, Schou, Ragsdale, & Welch, 2001). Confidentiality addresses matters 
associated with unauthorized disclosure and limits access to information. Integrity refers 
to the assurance of the accuracy, consistency, and trustworthiness of information, as well 
as the steps to prevent alteration of the information by unauthorized users. Availability is 
the guarantee of ensuring that authorized users have reliable access to information 
(Schneier, 2015). Despite the significant impact of CIA for organizations, these concepts 
are often more useful for security professionals. They are abstract and less meaningful to 
regular users. Safeguarding data confidentiality at times, involves specialized training for 
people who have access to personal information. The specialized training typically 
includes security risks that may threaten personal information, password-related best 
practices, information related to social engineering methods, and possible prevention 
strategies (van Schaik, Jansen, Onibokun, Camp, & Kusev, 2018). However, most 
LinkedIn users are not privy to such specialized training. Hence they are not familiar with 
many security risks factors and how to safeguard against them.  
 Additionally, information security for LinkedIn users is a significant factor due to 
the multiplexity of internet-enabled devices that are used to access the virtual community. 
Several of these devices are often unpatched and configured with default or weak 
passwords. Moreover, the increasing popularity of accessing PVCs with mobile devices 
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has attracted the attention of cyber criminals (McAfee, 2012; Shih et al., 2008). In 
comparison to PCs, mobile devices typically have weaker defense capabilities (Zhang, 
2011b). Hence, as mobile malware and virus increases in frequency and sophistication, 
PVC has become a viral attack vector, causing damages such as information loss, leaking 
of user privacy, and information theft (Chiang & Tsaur, 2011). Despite the development 
and use of new security practices and techniques to address the security risks in PVCs, 
PVC users continue to experience a growing number of technology threats security 
incidents primarily caused by accessing PVCs using mobile devices. As highlighted by 
He (2013), a clear majority of social media applications for mobile devices do not include 
the necessary security safeguard measures to protect user information. 
 
Past Literature  
 Prior IT security studies have consistently revealed that IT users analyze 
perceived susceptibility and perceived severity of adverse consequences to determine the 
security behavior of users against malicious IT threats. However, the studies provide 
inconsistent results as to whether both constructs always determine security behavior 
(Liang & Xue, 2010). Woon et al. (2005) indicated that perceived severity determines 
whether individuals take security measures to protect their home wireless network 
security. Ng et al. (2009) revealed that perceived susceptibility impacts users’ security 
behavior to protect their emails, while Workman et al. (2008) showed that both perceived 
susceptibility and perceived threats determined user IT behavior. As the perception of 
threat increases, users are more motivated to engage in protection practices. This notion 
is evident in the health protective behavior literature (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; 
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Rosenstock, 1974) and similarly in the IT security literature (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; 
Liang & Xue, 2009).  
Knowledge is the understanding of a subject, fact, or information, acquired 
through education or experience (Safa et al., 2016). The norms of PVCs users to 
consistently share information provides an innovative platform for their members to 
collaborate, solve problems, develop new ideas, and or establish policies or procedures 
(Wang & Noe, 2010). Marwick and Boyd’s (2014) study specified that it is challenging 
to meaningfully control the flow of information in a networked space where content is 
accessible and persistent. Managing information flow is more difficult as while users may 
regulate what they share on their profiles using different privacy settings, they cannot 
control what their friends share or what they post about them.  
PVC users are continually faced with the trade-off between the perceived benefits, 
the desires to fully engage, connect with professionals, and job search in the virtual world 
on the one hand and the privacy and security infringement that results from sharing on 
the other, a concept Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) described as a paradox. 
Furthermore, Norberg et al. (2007) indicated that while users express significant concerns 
about their data, they are less than selective in the protection of their data profiles. They 
“often willingly, even eagerly, part with intimate details of their lives” (O’Harrow, 2005, 
p.54).  
According to Such and Rovatsos (2016), PVCs’ privacy and security controls are 
challenging to understand, require time-consuming manual configuration, and do not 
allow for appropriate management. Also, users must set various security controls, 
consider many accessors, and perform fine-grained modifications for many items. As a 
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result, many users are not capable of managing the complexity of security management in 
PVCs. Lack of security control also leads to multiple data breaches and security 
violations (Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014). 
PVCs users cannot be entirely anonymous. With sophisticated “re-identification” 
algorithms, de-identified data can be easily re-identified. As highlighted by Narayanan 
and Shmatikov (2010, p. 26) “the versatility and power of re-identification algorithms 
imply that terms such as ‘personally identifiable’ and ‘quasi-identifier’ merely have no 
technical meaning.”  Hence, users have little or no legal protection for the information 
they self-disclose (Dhami, Agarwal, Chakraborty, Singh, & Minj, 2013). Individual 
computer users do not have formal organizational compliance controls (Siponen et al., 
2014). Therefore, individual IT users require other methods of controls for their threat 
avoidance behavior. However, no comprehensive model within the current literature 
provides a precise mechanism for Internet users to adhere to PVC security policies.  
The concept of security control is more critical as industries such as healthcare, 
financial, and retail engage in web delivery and services, as well as increase levels of 
personalization. The challenges and complexities significantly increased for individuals, 
organizations, and government with the proliferation of PVCs. The legal framework of 
individual security management has been protracted into the technical context of PII, 
which comprises any evidence that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s 
identity, such as date of birth, name, social security number, and biometric records 
(Marwick & Boyd, 2014).   
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Identification of Gaps 
Many studies have examined the area of user behavior on social media platforms. 
However, most of the studies focus on privacy. Saridakis, Benson, Ezingeard, and 
Tennakoon (2016) noted an imbalance in behavioral research on online social networks, 
with many reviews on privacy, while issues about information security remain mostly 
unexplored. Saridakis et al. (2016) studied the relationship of social-network users’ 
activity and security perceptions of personal information security on social networking 
services (SNS) to online victimization. They found individuals with high perceived 
control over personal information on the social network, individuals with high perceived 
risk propensity on social networks, and individuals with multi-purpose social networks 
are less likely to be victims of cybersecurity attacks, while users of knowledge exchange 
social networks are more likely to experience cyber security attacks.   
Much of the current literature that emphasizes user security behavior are studies 
conducted in corporate environments. These studies highlight the potential economic 
losses to organizations resulting from online information and security breaches 
(Campbell et al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004), further adding to the shortage of 
coverage of security threats at the individual level. However, previous studies have 
indicated that organizations that have neglected to concentrate on individuals’ security 
practices fail to accomplish success in their efforts to preserve security (Li et al., 2010; 
Stanton et al., 2005; Webb et al., 2014). Additionally, Abraham (2011) conducted an 
extensive literature review of the factors that affect information security behavior. 
Despite a wealth of studies in the area, Abraham reported that most of the studies focused 
on “compliance with security policies.” Anderson et al. (2010), examined the 
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behavioral intentions of “home” computer users. They focused on the impact of factors 
such as attitude, self-efficacy, subjective norms, and psychological ownership. 
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) found that technical efficacy is the crucial factor to ensure 
security. No prior study examined the combination of constructs, including 
safeguarding cost, user experience, coupled with group norms through an integrated 
model to motivate individual computer users to engage in security behavior. 
While several studies presented profile sharing as a risk to security in virtual 
communities, researchers have failed to provide irrefutable evidence as to why Internet 
users who claim to value their privacy still chose to share sensitive information online. 
As a result, the issue of privacy paradox continues to be a predominant factor, especially 
in the context of virtual communities (Sutanto, Palme, Tan, & Phang, 2013). Prior studies 
alluded disclosure in VCs to unawareness to the risks and problems of security threats. 
However, they failed to provide a mechanism by which Internet users can develop their 
confidence and the required skills to protect their data and systems from technology 
threats (Lutz & Strathoff, 2014). 
Despite the overwhelming level of knowledge that is shared among users in 
PVCs, it remains mainly about personal, social, political, and economic concepts. Also, 
many of the extant computer security literature on user information security knowledge 
sharing and information security experience relate to information security behavior in 
organizations (Safa & Von, 2016; Safa et al., 2016; Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 
2014). This study focuses on information knowledge sharing in the context of PVCs, on 
the basis that knowledge sharing is a factor of involvement, which is predicted to 
heighten avoidance motivation. Unlike organizations, PVCs do not have common 
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security goals, and individual users have their motivations for accessing the environment. 
Therefore, the researcher will incorporate information security knowledge sharing as a 
measure of involvement to determine how the sharing of security knowledge among PVC 
users may impact users’ technology threat avoidance motivation and further avoidance 
behavior.  
 Furthermore, several studies have investigated the security behavior in 
understanding the home computer usage and compliance in organizations (Arachchilage 
& Love, 2014; Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Li & Siponen, 2011; Liang & Xue, 
2010; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). However, there is insufficient evidence in the 
literature on user security behavior in virtual communities and how to motivate individual 
users to engage in technology threats avoidance behavior, through an integrated 
approach. Moreover, continuing research on online safety recommends new motivational 
factors for technology threat avoidance (Tsai et al., 2016).  
 
Summary  
There are many security issues in PVC environments, including virtualization, 
big-data processing, application security, access control, and authentication. 
Progressively, many information security-related practices such as patch management 
and antivirus updates are being automated to lessen task knowledge and loads on users, 
while increasing the use of advanced technology such as encryption and machine 
learning (Choi, Choi, & Kim, 2014). Appropriate security policies in PVCs are 
addressing other tasks such as the appropriate use of computer and network resources, 
multifactor authentication, and good password habits. For instance, many VCs have 
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built-in multi-layered password requirements, account and activity verification, and 
investigation of suspicious activities or violations of terms or policies. Also, data access 
requires authentication and access control model due to access right for users. 
However, through networked publics, constructed spaces of networked 
technologies and imagined communities, PVCs have established platforms where 
individuals can share and connect with other professionals. In this environment, users are 
forced to reassess their security practices (He, 2013). While online technologies raised 
numerous information management issues of security, new technologies, including large 
databases and social media, have further complicated security practices. Such 
technologies transform the information landscape and raise concerns about group norms, 
sharing, and security policies in PVCs. Since PVC content may be distributed globally, it 
is the tendency to argue that the only way to maintain total control of one’s data and to 
keep security controls is not to share at all. However, PVCs emerge and expand based on 
the level of sharing and collaboration of its members. Hence, security policy and 
strategies are developed to assist with the protection of users’ data. Nevertheless, users 
continue to experience multiple data breaches and security threats.  
There are limited studies that address the regulations PVCs users can undertake 
to increase their security, as well as guidelines to motivate avoidance behavior. 
Additionally, even with the guidance provided by federal regulations regarding security 
policies, there remain some policy gaps in many areas. Furthermore, while PVCs are 
making efforts to improve security using technology tools, research indicates that 
information security cannot be achieved by technological tools alone. Hence, new 
approaches, including information knowledge sharing, increasing self-efficacy, 
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organizational culture, and the appropriate level safeguarding measure costs are essential 
to motivate user information security behavior.  
The application of critical constructs from the technology threat theory, 
involvement theory and social cognitive theory to address individual security behavior 
in PVCs in an integrated approach provided a formal model to guide security threat 
avoidance practices in PVCs.  As a result, this study developed a framework that 
addressed the gaps in the literature by using information security sharing and 
information security knowledge experience to increase user information security 
avoidance motivation behavior in PVCs. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Methodology 
 
Overview of Research Design   
In this study, the researcher developed a conceptual model by synthesizing three 
theories: technology threat avoidance theory, involvement theory, and social cognitive 
theory, to explain user information security behavior in professional virtual communities. 
The research model comprises nine constructs: safeguarding measure cost, self-efficacy, 
perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, information security knowledge sharing, 
information security experience, group norms, avoidance motivation, and avoidance 
behavior. This study employed an online survey methodology to collect information 
relating to each construct, users’ security concerns, and LinkedIn experience and usage 
frequency. The researcher also collected demographic data, including gender, age, 
educational background, and ethnicity.  
This quantitative study employed a web-based survey to collect data as a one-time 
survey using a cross-sectional approach. Data were collected randomly from adult 
LinkedIn members over seven weeks to establish the relationship between avoidance 
motivation and avoidance behavior. According to Evans & Mathur (2005), a web-based 
survey is more accessible, easier to administer, and is more convenient to the respondents 
(online users) than a printed survey. Moreover, web-based surveys have simple 
descriptive statistics embedded, which provides available concurrent analysis, and more 
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sophisticated statistical analysis can be performed by exporting the data to appropriate 
statistical software. This unique data analysis feature in electronic surveys can reduce the 
time and resources required, especially for large datasets (Duffett et al., 2012). The 
embedded data analysis feature of the web-based survey also decreases the chance of 
human error affecting the integrity of the dataset, thereby increasing the reliability of the 
subsequent analysis (Bryman, 2012).  
The survey included a five-point Likert rating scale to give participants amble 
options to demonstrate their agreement with a statement. Except for one question, the 
scale ranged from (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree to (5) strongly 
agree. Question 4 measured self-efficacy and used a scale of (1) not confident at all, (2) 
slightly confident, (3) somewhat confident, (4) moderately confident, (5) very confident. 
The Likert scale is appropriate when capturing the attitudes of survey participants (Claar, 
2011; Ng et al., 2009; Rea & Parker, 2005). The survey applied a funnel approach, 
starting from demographics and general questions such as the number of years using 
LinkedIn and frequency of usage to more specific questions addressing the variables, in a 
manner that is easy for categorization and coding. The instrument had multiple parts, an 
introduction, to identify the research, establish the purpose of the study, and provide 
instructions for completing the survey; a set of calibration questions to ascertain the 
participants’ user information security behavior in professional virtual communities, and 
LinkedIn related items.  
The unit of analysis was individual LinkedIn users, regardless of educational 
background, gender, occupation, or information security experience. Respondents were 
self-selected to participate in the survey. This study was structured in four stages: expert 
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panel review, pilot study, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using AMOS, and 
structural equation modeling (SEM) using AMOS.  
 
Data Collection  
The primary data collection method for this study was a web-based survey. A 
web-based survey was appropriate since the target respondents are online users and have 
access to the Internet. Hence, the participants could respond to the survey at any time and 
place. Web-based surveys provide an advantage of obtaining data efficiently with regards 
to time, energy, and costs. Web surveys make quantifiable data easy to analyze and 
interpret, as well as collect standardized, quantitative data from a large sample size 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Checkmarket.com hosted the survey.  
The survey was distributed to 1285 LinkedIn members, over the age of 18.                                                                                                                      
The survey was distributed on the public LinkedIn platform in adherence with the 
LinkedIn privacy policy. The survey was disseminated using a variety of other methods: 
via email, send with CheckMarket’s email collector system, and with the researcher’s 
email system, the web, using URL/social media, post to LinkedIn, and QR code, and 
short messaging service (SMS) mobile text. All participants were sent an invitation with a 
brief description of the study, information about the informed consent, confidentiality, 
and a link with the URL of the survey. The participants received three email reminders 
about the survey. Respondents completed the web-based survey anonymously. The 
respondents were not monitored. Respondents could complete the survey from any 
location, using any device. The survey responses were automatically collected and stored 
in CheckMarket’s database. 
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Instrument Development and Validation  
Instrument Development 
Since there are no comprehensive instruments designed to measure all the 
constructs of the proposed model in an integrated approach, therefore, the researcher 
constructed a survey instrument. Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, and Wei (2003) indicated that 
adapting items from prior studies will enhance validity. Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 
argued that (2003, p. 291) “adopting or adapting questions is more efficient than 
developing questions yourself if it enables you to gather the appropriate data needed to 
meet the demands of the study,” therefore, the survey instrument (questionnaire) was a 
combination of questions adapted and adopted from previous research. As many PVC 
users only use their mobile devices to access their profile, the survey was designed “fit 
for mobile.”  
A web-based survey consisting of 42 self-reported items were designed to collect 
responses from LinkedIn users. Except for self-efficacy with five items and avoidance 
motivation with three items, each construct was measured with four items. The number of 
items was moderately low, as research has shown insignificant improvement on internal 
consistency with more than five items per construct. Also, keeping a survey short can 
eliminate possible response bias triggered by respondents’ fatigue (Hinkin, 1998). The 
survey comprised of a series of questions to collect demographic information such as 
gender, age, and years of experience using LinkedIn, as well as questions to elicit 
information on the constructs of the research including safeguarding measure cost, self-
efficacy, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, information security knowledge 
sharing, information security experience, group norms, avoidance motivation, and 
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avoidance behavior. The constructs were established based on a thorough review of the 
literature and derived from the elements of TTAT, Involvement theory, and SCT. To 
develop a measure for avoidance behavior in information security, the existing measures 
in the IS literature (e.g., Furman et al, 2009; Liang & Hue, 2010; Ng et al, 2009; Nyeste, 
2011) were evaluated to reflect tasks that relate to protecting user information and 
computer systems in professional virtual communities. All the items were adapted from 
prior related research for this study. The items that were not appropriate for the context of 
this study were rephrased or redefined. 
Items for self-efficacy were adapted from Compeau and Higgins (1995), Rhee, 
Kim, and Ryu (2009) and Liang and Xue (2010). These items examined self-efficacy in 
information security; for instance, users rated their confidence on each item based on 
their ability to solve problems dealing with information security and their ability to 
protect their information and computer systems. The information security experience 
items measured whether users’ computers have been infected with malware and whether 
users have been a victim of cyber fraud. Avoidance motivation items measured security 
practice from both technology aspect and security-conscious behavior.  
 The constructs of perceived threat severity and perceived susceptibility were 
adapted from Liang and Xue (2010) and Dinev and Hart (2004). Safeguarding measure 
cost and avoidance motivation items were adapted from Liang and Xue (2010) and Milne 
et al. (2002). These items assessed users’ perception of the potential harm of malicious 
technology threats and examined the probability of a malicious technology threat’s 
occurrence. Items for avoidance motivation were based on the behavioral intention 
measures from technology adopted research (Ling & Xue, 2009; Ng et al., 2009; Smith, 
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1996). These items were modified slightly to suit the context of information security and 
threat avoidance rather than information technology adoption.  
Information security knowledge sharing was measured with items adapted from 
Claar (2011) and Hsu et al. (2007), who developed measurement items from Davenport 
and Prusak (1998). These items were modified to fit user information security behavior in 
PVCs. Information security knowledge sharing items focused on the willingness to share 
information on technology threats and security solutions. Additionally, items measuring 
group norms were adapted from Tamjidyamcholo et al. (2013). These items explored the 
strength of executing the shared goal by an individual member and other members within 
the PVC.  
After the initial development of a survey instrument based on the literature, the 
researcher collected feedback from a panel of experts to ensure instrument validity. 
Following the expert panel review, the initial instrument was adjusted by rewording, 
restructuring, adding, and removing items. The revised instrument was then pilot-tested 
to ensure members of the survey population easily understand it. The revised instrument 
was further modified based on the reviews and data analysis of the pilot test. 
Subsequently, data were collected using the final version of the instrument for data 
analyses. Table 1 contains the survey items and the source of each item. 
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Table 1  
Survey items for measuring user information security behavior in a PVC (e.g., LinkedIn) 
Constructs Description Source 
Self-efficacy  Please rate your confidence in ability to execute the 
following security features on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = 
not confident at all, 2 = slightly confident, 3 = somewhat 
confident, 4 = moderately confident, and 5 = very confident. 
 
SE1 I can easily enable security features on LinkedIn by myself. Compeau & 
Higgins, 
1995 
SE2 I can correctly install security software on my computer Liang and 
Xue 
SE3 I can use different security software to protect my 
information. 
Rhee et al. 
2009 
SE4 I can configure my web browser security settings.  Rhee et al. 
2009 
SE5 I can easily find information on how to secure my profile on 
LinkedIn 
Rhee et al. 
2009 
 
Safeguarding 
Measure 
Cost  
 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the 
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 – agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
SMC1 Enabling security measures decreases the convenience 
afforded by LinkedIn 
Fruin et al., 
1991 
SMC2 Enabling security features on LinkedIn would be time-
consuming. 
Milne et al., 
2002 
SMC3 Complying with the security requirements of LinkedIn is 
burdensome.  
Milne et al., 
2002 
SMC4 Security software may cause problems to other programs on 
my PC. 
Liang & 
Xue, 2010 
   
Perceived 
Susceptibility 
Please indicate the likelihood of being affected by the 
following security risks on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 = not at all 
likely, 2 = not very likely, 3 = somewhat likely, 4 = very 
likely, and 5 = extremely likely. 
 
PSUS1 Malware will infect my computer by visiting LinkedIn. Liang & 
Xue, 2010 
PSUS2 My identity will be stolen by accessing LinkedIn. Dinev & 
Hart, 2004 
PSUS3 My data will be corrupted by visiting LinkedIn. Dinev & 
Hart, 2004 
PSUS4 My personal information on LinkedIn could be misused.  Dinev & 
Hart, 2004 
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Perceived 
Severity 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the 
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
PSE2 Having my computer infected by malware through LinkedIn 
is a severe problem for me. 
Ng, et al., 
2009 
PSE3 Having my online identity stolen through LinkedIn is a 
severe problem for me.  
Woon et al., 
2005 
PSE4 Losing personal data because of malware through LinkedIn 
is a severe problem for me. 
Ng, et al., 
2009 
PSE5 Losing organizational data because of malware through 
LinkedIn is a severe problem for me. 
Ng, et al., 
2009 
 
 
  
Information 
Security 
Knowledge 
Sharing  
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the 
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
ISKS1 If I find new security threats, I will inform LinkedIn 
members.  
Hsu et al., 
2007 
ISKS2 If I find a solution to security threats, I will share with 
LinkedIn members. 
Hsu et al., 
2007 
ISKS3 Sharing of information security knowledge with LinkedIn 
members is always beneficial. 
Hsu et al., 
2007 
ISKS4 Sharing of information security knowledge with PVC 
members is valuable to me. 
Hsu et al., 
2007 
   
Information 
Security 
Experience  
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the 
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
ISE1 I have experience with my data being corrupted by 
malware.  
Claar, 2011 
ISE2 I have experience with my identity being stolen by a cyber-
attack. 
Claar, 2011 
ISE3 I have experience with my computer being infected with 
malware. 
Chang & 
Chen, 2008 
ISE4 I have experience with my personal data being misused 
through a cyber-attack. 
Chang & 
Chen, 2008 
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Group 
Norms  
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the 
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
GN1 Members encourage action that benefit the security of 
LinkedIn 
Zeng, et al., 
2009 
GN2 Members engage in activities that benefit the security of 
LinkedIn.  
Zeng, et al., 
2009 
GN3 Members take actions that avoid threats to the security of 
LinkedIn. 
Zeng, et al., 
2009 
GN4 Members are opposed to activities that may harm the 
security of LinkedIn. 
Zeng, et al., 
2009 
 
Avoidance 
Motivation 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the 
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
AM1 I intend to use security software to avoid malware on 
LinkedIn. 
Liang & 
Xue, 2010 
AM2 I plan to use security software to avoid malware on 
LinkedIn. 
Liang & 
Xue, 2010 
AM3 I will add additional security measures to protect my 
information on LinkedIn. 
Ng et al., 
2009 
   
Avoidance 
Behavior 
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the 
following statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
AB1 I update my computer security software regularly. Liang & 
Xue, 2010 
AB2 I look for a security icon, trust mark, or HTTPS to verify 
that LinkedIn is secure before logging on. 
Furman et 
al., 2012 
AB3 I have changed the security settings on my computer that 
pertain LinkedIn access. 
Nyeste, 
2011 
AB4 I add additional software to mitigate impacts of information 
security breaches on LinkedIn. 
Ng et al., 
2009 
 
Reliability  
Reliability is “the degree to which measures are free from error and, therefore, 
yield consistent results” (Zikmund, 1988, p. 260). Each of the measures were previously 
validated (Chang & Chen, 2008; Claar, 2011; Dinev & Hart, 2004; Furman et al., 2012; 
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Hsu et al., 2007; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al, 2009; Zeng, et al., 2009). However, many 
of these measures were not testing in the context of professional virtual communities, and 
these measures were not previously tested as an integrated instrument. The goal of 
reliability testing is to establish the possible measurement error in a measurement model 
and method (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). An interval ratio scale measured the test 
participants’ differences, order, and equality of the magnitude of the differences in the 
variables and to provide a method of analyzing the arithmetic values quantitatively.    
The instrument was analyzed using the inter-item consistency reliability test, 
based on the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient (α) method, to evaluate if the variables are 
reliably constructed. The Cronbach’s Alpha is an appropriate method to determine 
internal consistency reliability when the researcher uses Likert scale questions in the 
survey instrument (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). The Cronbach’s Alpha for internal 
consistency reliability in confirmatory research should be a minimum of 0.70 (Gefen, 
Straub, & Boudreau, 2000; Straub et al., 2004). Therefore, the reliability processing result 
considered an acceptable significant level of reliability for the item measures that 
returned a Cronbach’s Alpha close to 1.  
However, Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient (α) may under or overestimate reliability 
(Raykov, 1997, 1998a). According to (Bollen, 1989, p.221) coefficient alpha (α) “makes 
no allowances for correlated error of measurements, nor does it treat indicators 
influenced by more than one latent variable."  Therefore, the composite reliability was 
also calculated to evaluate the reliability of the scale more accurately. The composite 
reliability is a measure of the overall reliability of a scale based on each construct within 
the scale (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).   
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According to Zikmund (1988), to detect and eliminate errors with a survey 
instrument before distributing the survey to all respondents, it is crucial to implement a 
pilot trial run. Sekaan (2003) recommends a pretest of a survey, to ensure questions are 
appropriately worded, measurements are used correctly, and questions are interpreted 
correctly. For this study, a pilot test was used to test the reliability of the instrument, to 
eliminate errors and bias, and to establish consistent measurement across the items. The 
instrument was converted to a web-based survey and distributed to a group of 22 virtual 
community users to review and provide feedback. The pilot participants also completed a 
set of review questions to guide their feedback. The review questions focused on the 
elements of the survey, including the instructions, test questions, format, and length of 
time to complete. The pilot participants indicated yes or no to whether they found each 
element of the survey operative, clear, and easy to understand.  
The pilot participants provided details of any element they found to be ineffective, 
unclear, or confusing. The comments from the pilot test were reviewed, and appropriate 
changes made to the instrument based on the results of the test. The results of the survey 
were stored in CheckMarket’s database server and were automatically transferred into the 
IBM statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) database, to eliminate transcription 
and transfer errors (Roztocki & Lahri, 2003; Stanton, 1998).  
 
Validity 
Zikmund (1988, p. 262) defined validity as “whether a measure ... measures what 
it is supposed to measure.” To ensure that the quality of the instrument is high, that it 
measures the variables accurately, and to assess the goodness of the measures, the 
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researcher completed a series of preliminary analysis. The preliminary analysis includes 
an item analysis, reliability, and validity test. Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) 
indicated that content validity is critical to remove items from formative scales based on 
theoretical methods without compromising the robustness of the instrument. Sekeran 
(2003) posited that content validity “ensures that the measure includes an adequate and 
representative set of items that tap the concept” (p. 206).  
According to Bagozzi and Phillips (1991), construct validity refers to the extent to 
which the measure of a construct adequately measures the intended concept. Schwab 
(1980, p.5) defined construct validity as “representing the correspondence between 
a construct (conceptual definition of a variable) and the operational procedure to measure 
or manipulate that construct.” Schwab (1980) further indicated that a construct is a 
significant part of construct validation, a multistep process for assessing the adequacy of 
measures.  Construct validity determines the degree to which each measure correctly 
measures its targeted variable. Additionally, construct validity also eliminates excessive 
random errors such as measurement errors or informant bias that may weaken the 
statistical results and lead to false acceptance of the null hypotheses (Nunnally, 
1978). Construct validity was established to conclusively identify the significant 
relationships among various social constructs and their effects on user information 
security behavior in PVCs. 
Straub (1989) argued that validity could be established by allowing experts 
familiar with the content of the research to evaluate the instrument until they reach a 
consensus on the content of the instrument. Sekaran (2003) recommended the use of an 
expert panel to ensure the content validity of the measures within a survey. The 
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researcher conducted an expert panel review to establish content validity. The literature 
does not specify the precise number of experts to include in a pretest. However, Olson 
(2010) posited that an expert panel could be as few as two to over 20 reviewers, while 
Presser and Blair (1994) highlighted that the number of expert reviewers tends to be 
small, with two or three experts. Accordingly, three experts with relevant information 
security, research methodology, and social media background were consulted for this 
study. The expert panel consisted of one information security subject matter expert 
(SME), one professor in quantitative analysis and research methods, and a social media 
analyst.  
The panel reviewed the survey instrument using an expert panel survey evaluation 
tool. The evaluation tool was adapted from the Olson (2010) research, which is based on 
an examination of a questionnaire evaluation by expert reviewers. The panel was asked to 
review and provide comments on the survey instrument according to the evaluation tool 
standards. The evaluation tool examined the content, cognitive and usability features, and 
the overall structure of the instrument. The panel was also asked to rate each question on 
the characteristics of burdensome, sensitivity, and potential failure of the response 
process. Overall, the panel verified that the measurement items (empirical indicators) are 
adequate, represent the concepts, and are logically as well as theoretically connected to 
the construct, user security behavior.  
Construct validity can also be established through factor analysis (Straub, 1989). 
The researcher employed a series of empirical tests to evaluate the measurement 
properties of the empirical indicators and established that they are unidimensional, 
reliable, and valid. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to examine the linear 
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association among the empirical indicators regarding the latent variables, to assess 
the unidimensionality of the measures (Kim & Mueller, 1978). Confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) method was also used to assess the hypotheses (Gerbing & Anderson, 
1988). The CFA model was specified with the latent variable and the associated empirical 
indicators. The empirical indicators to load on specific variables were restricted 
before analyzing the data. Variables with low loading (<0.50) or non-significant loading 
were removed from the latent variable unless it was predetermined that theoretically the 
factor should not be eliminated. Factors with Eigenvalue greater than 1 and factor loading 
higher than 0.50 were retained for further analysis (Walker, Gebregriabher, Martin-
Harris, & Egede, 2015).  
 The extent to which the data collected were applicable or transferable to other 
virtual communities hinged on the validity of the study. The internal validity of the study 
measures the confidence in the strength of the relationship and the effect sizes between 
the variables. Internal validity supports the justifications for the results of the study and 
assists to decrease other unexpected reasons for the results. The history and maturation 
effects in the study were controlled by capturing data from users simultaneously within a 
short space of time, to reduce the impact of possible changes that may occur over time. 
 
Population and Sample 
The target population for the study was LinkedIn members. The participants were 
randomly selected and have a wide variance in computer understanding, information 
security abilities, and expertise, and covers a variety of industries, age groups, and 
backgrounds. The random sampling approach eliminated select bias and allowed for a 
53 
 
 
 
better representation of the target population (Son & Kim, 2008). This study sought to 
establish the generalizability of the population through a reliable and valid sample size 
with high precision, a margin of error of +/-5%, standard deviation of .5 and a confidence 
level of 95%. At the time of data collection, there were approximately 5,000,000 
LinkedIn members (Aslam, 2018).  
From this population, a minimum sample size of 385 was needed to obtain a 30% 
response rate. A total of 1285 survey participants were invited to participate in the study. 
Of the 1285 invited participants, 388 participants responded to the survey, resulting in a 
response rate of 30%.  According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), a response rate of 30% 
is an acceptable response rate. Three email reminders were sent to the participants to 
increase the response rate. For respondents who started but did not complete the survey, a 
reminder email was sent one day after the respondents began the survey. 
 
Pre-analysis Data Screening 
 According to Levy (2006, p. 150), “pre-analysis data preparation deals with the 
process of detecting irregularities or problems with the collected data.” SEM programs 
standard errors are calculated on the assumption that data were collected from a large 
sample size, primarily when data are not normally distributed or otherwise flawed. 
According to Loehlin (2004), for a model of up to four factors, at least 100 data cases 
should be collected. The data were prescreened to ensure that any quality issues were 
addressed and that the conclusion drawn from the data collected was valid (Mertler & 
Vannatta, 2009). First, the data were prescreened for incomplete or missing data. To 
reduce the possibility of missing data in the collection process, the survey was created 
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with all items set as a required field. Of the 388 respondents, eight had missing data. The 
researcher employed a listwise deletion approach as an ad hoc solution to the missing 
data problem. The listwise approach was appropriate, as the proportion of cases with 
missing data was small, at two percent.  
According to Roth (1994), if the proportion of missing data is less than five 
percent, the listwise deletion approach may be acceptable. Following Rubin’s (1976) 
missing data mechanisms, it was assumed that the data were missing completely at 
random (MCAR) as all the records with missing data values had responses for only the 
first two demographic questions. MCAR was an assumption, as there is no certainty. As 
highlighted by Schafer and Graham (2002), "when missingness is beyond the researcher's 
control, its distribution is unknown, and MAR is only a postulation. Also, traditionally, 
the listwise deletion has been considered most appropriate for SEM with large sample 
sizes, over 250 (Hair et al., 2014). This study matched that criteria with N= 380. The 
survey data was also prescreened for skewness and kurtosis (Hair et al., 2014).  
 
Data Analysis  
Upon completion of data collection activities, the data were analyzed utilizing the 
Cronbach alpha (CA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and structural equation 
modeling (SEM) techniques. This study used IBM SPSS program to analyze the survey 
data. Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM) using AMOS 
(Analysis of Moment Structures) software were used to confirm and interpret the results 
from the primary data gathered. CFA was conducted to establish the validity of the model 
by assessing and establishing the validity of factor loadings on the variables and the 
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relationships between the variables (Hooper, Coughlan, & Muller, 2008). Acceptance of 
the results was contingent on the amount of variance in the dependent variable and was 
accounted for by the independent variable and the effect size.  
According to Aruckle (2007), SEM is the most suitable method to examine the 
relationship between independent, mediating, and dependent variables. SEM allows a 
researcher to exam a group of regression equations concurrently. It confirms the loading 
relationships between the measured and latent variables and determines the covariances 
between the latent variables through model fitness (Foster & Barkus, 2006). Within SEM, 
the researcher tested various configurations of the path diagrams. The optimal path was 
selected to represent the data graphically. Additionally, SEM was used to analyze the 
structural relationships among the observed and unobserved variables of the hypotheses 
using path diagrams, and to investigate the contributing powers of the factors as to how 
they significantly affect user information security behavior.  
SEM includes a series of multivariate techniques that are confirmatory rather than 
exploratory in model fit testing (McDonald, 2013). The SEM approach defined a 
theoretical causal model with a set of predicted covariances between the variables. The 
proposed model in this study stems from the literature and three fundamental theories- 
technology threat avoidance theory, involvement theory, and social cognitive theory. 
Consequently, path and confirmatory factor analysis within SEM are acceptable for this 
study (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). SEM is a suitable approach for this survey as it 
encompasses a vast array of complex statistical relationships and models such as path 
analysis, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and time series analyses (Hair et al., 2010). 
In the SEM analyses, the results obtained from the sample data were validated to 
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develop general conclusions about user information security behavior in virtual 
communities. The results were analyzed based on features of overall indices of model fit, 
parameter estimates, and standard errors. 
For power estimation of the factors, the MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara 
(1996) estimate the power approach was adopted, which is relative to an alternative 
hypothesis specified regarding lack of fit. The goodness of fit, a primary SEM statistic, 
reflects the difference between the observed model’s covariance matrix and the minimum 
fit model’s covariance matrix. The estimate was based on the degrees of freedom (dfs) of 
the model, and the root means square error of approximation (RMSEA), (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993). Estimates with values of .06 or less represented a close-fitting model (Hu 
& Bentler, 1999) and were accepted, while values larger than .10 illustrated poor-fitting 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993) and were rejected. After establishing that the model is 
reasonable, the hypotheses were tested by evaluating the model parameter estimates for 
both the exogenous and endogenous variables of the study (Walker et al., 2015).  
The parameter estimates or coefficients were examined for each path in the SEM 
model to determine if one path is more significant than other paths in 
predicting avoidance motivation and user information security behavior. Additionally, the 
study compared the covariance matrix to determine if the proposed model is an effective 
way to model the relationships among the variables. Chi-square and comparative fit 
index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990) fit statistics were used to determine if the data fit the 
PVCTTAM and the extent to which the theoretical model was supported.  CFI is an 
indicator in estimating the improvement in non-centrality when going from observed to a 
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null model. The study accepted CFI values greater than 0.95, which represents good 
fitting models (Hu & Bentler, 1999).   
This study builds on extant literature on information security by establishing 
methods to curtail the distribution of personal information that may expose users to 
security threats. The study also presents a case for the motivation of users to engage in 
information security knowledge sharing actively, to increase self-efficacy and experience 
to effectively identify and implement information security methods to protect their 
systems and information in the virtual world. This study also identifies factors for virtual 
community designers and lawmakers to consider users’ information security behavior and 
technology threat avoidance. 
 
Resource Requirements  
Before collecting data, permission the researcher obtained from the Nova 
Southeastern University institutional review board (IRB), as shown in Appendix B. 
Draw.io diagrams, a diagramming and collaboration software was used to design the 
conceptual model. CheckMarket hosted and stored the survey data. Data tables were 
prescreened and stored using Microsoft Excel. The survey was distributed via 
LinkedIn.com, Gmail, and Yahoo. Data analysis was executed using the IBM statistical 
package for social science (SPSS) 24 and IBM analysis of a moment structures (AMOS) 
25. An expert panel was used to validate the survey instrument.  
 
Summary  
This chapter presents a detailed account of the proposed user professional virtual 
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community technology threat avoidance model (PVCTTAM) and its variables, the 
instrument development, and the research methodology used in this quantitative study. 
To establish content validity the instrument was developed based on an extensive review 
of the literature, including theories, past instruments, and models related to user 
information security, technology threat avoidance, and virtual communities. The 
instrument, presented in Appendix A, was developed by adapting and adopting items 
from prior research.  An expert panel review was conducted to test the face and content 
validity, an expert study. The reliability of the test was established using the inter-item 
consistency reliability test, based on the Cronbach’s coefficient Alpha method, with data 
from the study.  
This study employed a web-based survey methodology. The survey was 
distributed via email, social media, and SMS randomly to 1285 adult LinkedIn members. 
Before administering the survey, an expert panel review and a pilot study were conducted 
to assist in ensuring the reliability and validity of the instrument. The survey was then 
administered to the main survey population. After the data were collected, the data were 
prescreened for missing data, skewness, and kurtosis. The reliability and validity of the 
data were also assessed to reduce measurement errors and improve the overall fit of the 
model (Hair et al., 2014). For data analysis, the researcher used SPSS 24 and AMOS 25. 
The data analysis methods utilized were Cronbach’s Alpha (CA), confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA), and structural equation modeling (SEM). Each hypothesis was evaluated 
by examining the associated variables and the path. This chapter also presented an 
overview of the general issues about barriers, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Results 
 
Overview  
This study aims to understand the factors which influence professional virtual 
community users to engage in security avoidance behaviors against technology threats. 
The research examined two central questions: 
1. How do factors from the technology threat avoidance theory and involvement 
theory predict individual computer users’ technology threat avoidance 
motivation in professional virtual communities? 
2. How do self-efficacy, group norms, and avoidance motivation safeguards 
predict users’ avoidance security behavior in professional virtual 
communities? 
On the hypotheses, there are nine constructs and eight paths in the professional 
community model. Safeguarding measure cost, self-efficacy, perceived susceptibility, 
perceived severity, information security knowledge sharing, information security 
experience, and group norms are the latent (unobservable) variables in the model. A total 
of 29 items measured the latent variables. Except for self-efficacy with five items, all 
latent variables were measured with four items. The PVC model is represented using both 
structural and measurement models. The structural model is based on the relationships 
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among the latent variables, while the measurement model specifies the relationships 
between the observed and the latent variables (Safa et al., 2016).  
This study adopted the Hair et al. (2010) two-step SEM process approach. First, 
the model fit and construct validity were tested in CFA. Second, after achieving a 
measurement model with sufficiently valid measurements, the structural model was 
tested. Hence, the results of the model overall fit and validity were assessed based on two 
key tests, one measurement and one structural. CFA is a multivariate statistical theory-
testing procedure. CFA verify whether the data fit the theorized factor model and 
establish the extent of the relationship between observed variables and their latent 
constructs. CFA was appropriate for this study as the model was developed from a review 
of the research literature and established theories. SEM provides the added advantage of 
the isolation of observational error in the latent variable measurements. The dataset was 
also pretested in SPSS for reliability and validity, as well as preliminary statistical 
analysis including collinearity issues, missing data, and normality identification. 
 This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the data gathered from the survey 
respondents, using the online survey instrument, illustrated in Appendix A. This chapter 
also presents the results of the expert panel review and the pilot test, which was used to 
validate the instrument further. Additionally, this chapter includes the results of the 
Cronbach Alpha for reliability testing using SPSS, confirmatory factor analysis, and 
structured equation modeling approaches. The results of the measurement model and 
structural model data analyses and hypotheses testing were also presented, as well as a 
collective analysis and discussion of the findings of the study.  
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Expert Panel 
According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009), a questionnaire should be 
tested for systematic or built-in errors, possibilities of vagueness, bias, dual meaning, and 
technical inaccuracy. It is usual for researchers to rely on a panel of experts to assess the 
validity of the instrument (Olson, 2010).  To ensure the reliability and validity of the 
survey instrument, it was vetted by a panel of information security experts and research 
professor before it was administered to the survey population. Subject matter experts 
(SME) focused on the content and face validity of the survey instrument by exploring the 
theoretical constructs of the model and their operational representations. The experts also 
reviewed the instrument for clarity, readability, sensitive items, burdensomeness, logical 
flow, and other possible measurement errors in the survey.  
The expert panel vetted the instrument in two iterations. They provided feedback 
and rechecked the instrument until all experts were completely satisfied with the content. 
The panelists identified phrasings and implications issues with some items in the survey 
instrument. The experts further recommended changes to the length of the instrument, 
and adjustments to the wording and structure of some questions. The experts also guided 
rewording item choices based on a possible misinterpretation of avoidance versus 
mitigation and establishing item choices as actionable behavior. The researcher adjusted 
the instruments based on the changes suggested by the expert team; I reworded and 
restructured a few questions and eliminated two questions from the survey instrument. 
 
Pilot Study  
 A pilot study was undertaken to evaluate the reliability of the instrument,   
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the methods, and procedures of the main study, and to identify any potential problems 
with the survey. The pilot study also tested whether all the participants similarly 
interpreted the questions. The pilot study participants were selected based on the 
characteristics of the primary research. They were all LinkedIn members over the age of 
18. Thirty LinkedIn users were invited to participate in the pilot study. Each participant 
was advised to complete the survey and provide feedback on the overall quality of the 
survey. Specifically, participants were asked to provide feedback on the clarity of the 
survey items, the length of the survey, wording, ambiguity, and comprehension of the 
instrument Twenty-two respondents completed the survey. The pilot testing indicated that 
the participants understood and interpreted the questions correctly. After the pilot study, 
the researcher made two minor changes to the survey instrument. The ethnicity question 
was adjusted to allow respondents to select one choice, with an option for selecting 
multiple races and one item, was dropped from the instrument based on the pilot study’s 
reliability testing results. 
The data from the pilot testing were analyzed using IBM SPSS 24 for internal 
consistency reliability using Cronbach’s Alpha. The coefficient of reliability ranges from 
0 to 1. If all items in a scale have high covariances, the coefficient is closer to 1, as the 
number of items approaches infinity. An acceptable range of Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.700 
(Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000; Straub et al., 2004). The reliability statistics analysis 
for the pilot study revealed that all the items were a consistent measure for the scale. Self-
efficacy = 0.919 safeguard measure = 0.926, perceived susceptibility = 0.906, perceived 
severity = 0.974, information security experience = 0.922, and information security 
knowledge sharing = 0.780. While acceptable, the CA for information security 
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knowledge sharing was affected by a low inter-item correlation of ISKS5. This item was 
deleted from the instrument for the main study. Deleting item ISKS5 increased the CA 
for information security knowledge sharing to 0.809. The Cronbach’s Alpha for 
avoidance behavior was 0.763. Removal of item AB1 would slightly increase the CA for 
this construct. However, this item was not removed before the CFA analysis as the 
number of items measuring that construct was already low. The overall CA for the 
instrument, including an inter-inter correlation of all items was 0.897. 
 
Data Collection  
 The data were collected using an online survey hosted by CheckMarket, over 50 
days, ranging from February to March 2019. The instrument was initially pilot-tested 
through a small group of users before being distributed to the population of the main 
study. The final version of the survey had five sections with a total of 42 questions, with 
all except two constructs measured by four items. The link of the survey was distributed 
to 1285 adult LinkedIn members via email, SMS, and posted on the researcher’s 
LinkedIn page. A total of 388 respondents participated in the study, resulting in a 30% 
response rate. The data were automatically collected and stored in CheckMarket’s 
database to eliminate the possibility of data transfer or transcription errors. For analysis, 
the data were exported to an excel file. The excel file was then imported into SPSS and 
AMOS. Eight of the 388 surveys were incomplete.  
 The surveys with missing data were rejected and eliminated from the study. This 
method is feasible when the missing data is minimal, less than five percent (Roth,1994) 
and is assumed to be missing completely at random (Rubin, 1976). These data were 
64 
 
 
 
assumed to be MCAR as in each case, only up to the first two questions, age and gender 
were completed.  Finally, 380 surveys were saved in the primary dataset for further 
analysis. Of the 380 participants, 189 were males and 191 females. A significant amount 
of the respondents, forty-three percent, have been using LinkedIn for over five years. 
Most of the respondents, twenty-seven percent use LinkedIn at least once per month, 
while twenty-two percent use the platform daily. The participants’ demographics are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2  
Participants’ Demographics  
Variables  Frequency Percent 
Age (years) 
 
18-25 61 16.1 
26-35 97 25.5 
36-45 118 31.1 
46-55 67 17.6 
 56-65 29 7.6 
 Older than 65 
 
8 2.1 
Gender  Male 189 49.7 
 Female 
 
191 50.3 
LinkedIn Experience Less than 1 year 37 9.7 
 1-2 years 43 11.3 
 3-5 years 135 35.5 
 Over five years  
 
165 43.4 
LinkedIn Frequency  Regularly (Daily) 87 22.9 
 Frequently (At least once per week) 93 24.5 
 Occasionally (At least once per 
month) 
104 27.4 
 Seldom (At least once every six 
months  
48 12.6 
 Rarely (At least once per year) 
 
48 12.6 
Ethnicity  American Indian or Alaskan Native 3 .8 
 Asian 24 6.3 
 Black or African American 245 64.5 
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Note. N = 380 
 
Measurement Model  
Pre-analysis Data Screening 
The data were reviewed for missing data, skewness, and kurtosis. Standard 
skewness and kurtosis were applied to test the normal distribution of the data. Skewness 
and kurtosis values between -2 and +2 are considered acceptable to prove normal 
univariate distribution (George & Mallery, 2010). The results of the skewness tests were 
between -1 and +1, except for ISKS4, which was -1.046. The results of the kurtosis test 
were between -1.3 and +1.3. These results indicate a normal distribution of the dataset 
(George & Mallery, 2010; Hair et al., 2010). The detailed results of the skewness and 
Kurtosis and the descriptive properties of the dataset are presented in Appendix D.  
Internal Consistency Reliability  
 To measure the extent to which the measurement model measures the latent 
variables, the reliability of the scale was established. The initial reliability of the 
measurement model was assessed based on internal consistency reliability and composite 
reliability (CR). The internal consistency reliability, which examines the correlations 
between items and a factor was measured using the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient (α). In 
 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 1 .3 
 White 82 21.6 
 
 
Education  
 
 
Less than a high school diploma 
 
 
4 
 
 
1.1 
 High school diploma or equivalent  14 3.7 
 Some college but no degree 39 10.3 
 Associate degree 25 6.6 
 Bachelor’s degree 115 30.3 
 Graduate degree 183 48.2 
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social science research, internal reliability is reached when Cronbach’s Alpha value is 
greater than 0.70 (Straub et al., 2004). The Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated using SPSS.   
Cronbach’s Alpha is obtained under the assumption that all factor loadings and 
error variances are equally constrained; hence, the composite reliability was also 
computed to establish the true reliability of the scale. The composite reliability assesses 
the overall reliability of a construct, based on a group of items that are heterogeneous but 
similar. (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Composite reliability was calculated with AMOS 25.0 
program and Microsoft Excel, CR = [∑ factor loadings]2 / [∑ factor loadings]2 + ∑ [1- 
factor loadings2], using the modification and correlation indices. A value of .70 or higher 
represents an acceptable threshold for composite reliability (Hair et al., 1998). 
Table 3 shows the measures of both internal consistency reliability and composite 
reliability. The condition of internal consistency was met as the results of both the 
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability for all the constructs exceeded .70. Appendix 
E shows the detailed results of Cronbach’s Alpha calculation. 
 
Table 3  
Internal Consistency Reliability with Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability  
Constructs  MaxR(H) Composite 
Reliability 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Number 
of Items 
Self-Efficacy (SE) 0.908 0.902 0.902 5 
Safeguarding Measure Cost 
(SMC) 
0.808 0.776 0.769 4 
Perceived Susceptibility (PSUS) 0.897 0.876 0.870 4 
Perceived Severity (PSE) 0.966 0.960 0.960 4 
Information Security 
Knowledge Sharing (ISKS) 
0.924 0.897 0.902 4 
Information Security Experience 
(ISE) 
0.834 0.831 0.830 4 
Group Norms (GN) 0.919 0.868 0.815 4 
Avoidance Motivation (AM)  0.979 0.933 0.926 3 
Avoidance Behavior (AB) 0.839 0.813 0.811 4 
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Convergent and Discriminant Validity  
The scale was tested for both convergent and discriminant validity. The average 
variance extracted (AVE) was calculated to establish convergent validity. Malhotra and 
Dash (2011) noted that "AVE is a more conservative measure than CR. Based on CR 
alone, the researcher may conclude that the convergent validity of the construct is 
adequate, even though more than 50% of the variance is due to error” (Malhotra and 
Dash, 2011, p.702). AVE exceeding 0.5 demonstrates acceptable convergent validity 
(Hair et al., 2010). For the initial convergent validity testing, the constructs safeguarding 
measure cost, fell below the threshold, with an AVE of 0.473. Hence, all but one 
construct showed convergent validity, using this assessment. Appendix F shows the 
results of the initial convergent and discriminant validity testing, using the AVE and 
MSV methods. 
 The factor loadings of the measurement variables were also examined to validate 
the instrument. Factor loadings greater than 0.5 indicate acceptable convergent validity 
(Hair et al., 2010). Table 4 shows the results of the standardized factor loadings of the 
variables.  
 
Table 4 
Standardized Factor Loadings and Validity  
Constructs Items Factor 
Loadings 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Self-Efficacy (SE) SE1 .715 .902 .895 
SE2 .833 .878 
SE3 .855 .872 
SE4 .838 .873 
SE5  .777 .882 
SMC1 .615 .769 .724 
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Note. Factor loadings <0.06 are in red. Improved Cronbach’s Alpha if an item is deleted, 
highlighted in yellow. 
 
 
Problems with convergent validity indicate that its observed variables do not 
systematically explain the latent variable as the variables do not correlate well with each 
other. AVE can be improved by dropping cases, such as dropping the item with the most 
significant measurement error variance (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2015). Hair et al., 
Safeguarding Measure 
Cost (SMC)  
SMC2 .766 .672 
SMC3  .799 .681 
SMC4 .539 .774 
Perceived 
Susceptibility 
(PSUS)  
PSU1 .842 .870 .831 
PSU2 .824 .811 
PSU3 .882 .808 
PSU4  .632 .883 
Perceived Severity 
(PSE) 
PSE1 .888 .960 .955 
PSE2 .928 .943 
PSE3 .962 .938 
PSE4 .923 .951 
Information Security 
Knowledge Sharing  
(ISKS) 
ISKS1 .904 .902 .874 
ISKS2 .914 .869 
ISKS3 .741 .872 
ISKS4 .732 .880 
Information Security 
Experience (ISE) 
ISE1 .758 .830 .778 
ISE2 .688 .806 
ISE3 .741 .783 
ISE4 .782 .772 
Group Norms (GN) GN1 .860 .815 .731 
GN2 .939 .704 
GN3 .672 .769 
GN4 .440 .851 
Avoidance Motivation 
(AM) 
AM1 .940 .926 .872 
AM2 .987 .837 
AM3 .782 .963 
Avoidance Behavior 
(AB) 
AB1 .606 .811 .797 
AB2 .641 .774 
AB3 .803 .741 
AB4 .823 .736 
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(2014) highlighted that items with an outer loading between .40 and .70 should be 
considered for removal. Items with factor loading 0.6 and below were dropped from the 
model, before conducting the CFA data analysis. SMC4 in safeguarding measure cost and 
GN4 in group norms were removed from the model due to a low factor loading of 0.50 
and 0.44 respectively, SMC4 also had a high measurement variance of 12.591 As shown 
in Table 5, dropping the items increased the AVE for the construct. Removal of these 
items increased both the AVE and the Cronbach’s Alpha of the constructs. The AVE of 
group norms increased to 0.692, and the Cronbach’s Alpha increased to 0.851, while the 
AVE of safeguarding measure increased to 0.541 and the Cronbach’s Alpha to 0.774.  
To establish discriminant validity, the extent to which factors are distinct and 
uncorrelated, the correlations between all the possible pairs of constructs were explored. 
The discriminant validity was assessed by comparing the maximum shared variance 
(MSV) with the average variance extracted (AVE). To demonstrate discriminant validity, 
the MSV should be less than the value of AVE (MSV< AVE) for each construct (Hair et 
al., 2010). Based on the assessment, the MSV is less than the AVE for each construct. 
Also, using the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) method, the square 
root of the AVE was greater than the inter-construct correlations, as demonstrated in 
Table 5, in bold along the diagonal. Hence, the condition of discriminant validity for the 
constructs in the professional virtual community model was established. 
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Table 5  
Convergent and Discriminant Validity with Inter-Constructs Correlations 
Constructs  AVE MSV AM SE SMC PSUS PSE ISKS ISE GN AB 
AM 0.823 0.457 0.907                 
SE 0.648 0.203 0.244 0.805               
SMC 0.541 0.288 0.217 0.058 0.735             
PSUS 0.641 0.300 0.379 -0.016 0.462 0.801           
PSE 0.857 0.128 0.358 0.042 0.195 0.309 0.926         
ISKS 0.686 0.220 0.469 0.266 0.032 0.234 0.241 0.829       
ISE 0.552 0.300 0.296 0.113 0.537 0.548 0.226 0.132 0.743     
GN 0.692 0.175 0.393 0.283 0.163 0.198 0.121 0.382 0.165 0.832   
AB   0.526 0.457 0.676 0.450 0.260 0.442 0.280 0.364 0.368 0.418 0.725 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
In the CFA, the path diagram was established to represent the measurement 
theory of the professional virtual community model. The path diagram includes nine 
latent variables and 34 measured variables, along with their item loadings, the estimated 
relationships among the constructs, and the error terms for each indicator. CFA was 
applied to explore the relationships among the variables in the model. The maximum 
likelihood method in IBM AMOS 25 was used to estimate the models’ parameters. Once 
the crucial decisions were made about the estimation techniques, the measurement model 
was then tested to determine its validity by establishing acceptable goodness-of-fit and 
evidence of construct validity.  
Assessing the Measurement Model Fit 
CFA, a unique form of SEM analysis was used as a confirmatory test of the 
measurement theory to specify if the measure of the constructs is logically and 
systematically consistent with the theoretical assumptions of the model. The 
measurement theory model illustrated in Appendix G was represented using path 
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diagrams. The path diagram demonstrates the relationship between the measured 
variables and the latent constructs.  
In CFA, validity statistics, including modification fit indices, standardized 
loadings, and standardized residuals were used to determine the overall fit of the 
measurement model. According to Hair et al., (2010), to establish goodness-of-fit, it is 
essential to assess at least one absolute fit index and one incremental fit index, in 
addition to the result of the Chi-square (χ2). The goodness-of-fit (GOF) indices and their 
threshold values, identified as the rules of thumb by Hu and Bentler (1999) are shown in 
table 6 and table 9. 
Table 6  
Fit indices of the CFA Measurement Model 
  
 Adjustments were made to the model based on the modification indices and 
standardized residuals. Six covariances were established between the error variances to 
 Metric Indices Acceptable 
value 
Reported Values 
from model 
Reflection  
Chi-square 
(χ2) 
 
Chi-square  
Degrees of freedom 
p-Value 
Chi-square/ degrees of 
freedom 
 
 
 
≤ 3.00 
 
868.096 
453 
0.000 
1.916 
 
 
 
Good Validity  
Absolute Fit 
Measures 
Root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA)  
Root Mean Squared 
Residual (RMR) 
Standardized S(RMR) 
≤ 0.06 
 
≤ 1.00 
 
≤ 0.08 
0.049 
 
0.070 
 
0.054 
Good Validity  
 
Good Validity   
 
Good Validity  
Incremental 
Fit Indices 
Comparative fit index 
(CFI)  
Normed fit index (NFI) 
Incremental fit index (IFI) 
≥ 0.95 
 
≥ 0.90 
≥ 0.90 
0.955 
 
0.911 
0.955 
Good Validity 
 
Good Validity 
Good Validity 
Parsimony 
Fit Indices 
Adjusted goodness-of-fit 
index (AGFI) 
≥ 0.80 0.849 Good Validity 
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improve the fit of the model. The global fit measures and comparative fit measures were 
assessed to test the overall fit of the model. The central goodness-of-fit values using the 
Hu and Bentler (1999) threshold was used to evaluate the fit of the model. The chi-square 
test (χ2) with the degree of freedom was used to provide assessment for the global model 
fit criterion. 
 A chi-square value of equal or less than 2 indicates excellent fit. The overall 
model revealed a CMIN/df ratio of 868.096/453, resulting in a χ2 of 1.916. Therefore, the 
χ2 goodness-of-fit results are significant and indicate a fit between the actual data and the 
theoretical model.  The chi-square statistics are influenced by the sample size of the study 
and can lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. Based on this chi-square assumption, 
the dataset of 380 was an adequate sample size to establish fit with chi-square. 
 Due to the approximation of the p-value provided with chi-square tests, the 
incremental fit, absolute fit, and parsimonious fit statistics were also examined. 
Comparative fit index (CFI), an incremental fit index assesses the model with a 
parsimony adjustment and represents the difference between the observed and predicted 
covariance. CFI with a value greater than 0.955 establishes excellent fit. The study 
revealed a CFI value of 0.955. Other incremental fit indices established for the model 
include the normed fit index (NFI) and incremental fit index (IFI). The acceptable value 
for both NFI and IFI is 0.9. The measurement model fit results for both NFI and IFI were 
above the cut-offs at 0.911 for NFI and 0.955 for IFI. 
 The root mean square of approximation (RMSEA), an absolute fit index, 
evaluates the extent to which the model fit the covariance of the population. The value for 
RMSEA is 0.049. This value is below the 0.05 guideline (Hu & Bentler, 1999), 
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establishing a good fit for the model. These indices provide the support that the 
professional virtual community measurement model is an acceptable fit with the data, to 
minimize type I and type II errors. The model to this point has shown evidence that the 
measures have behaved as hypothesized regarding the unidimensionality of the measures 
for each of the nine constructs. The raw data for the CFA model fit statistics are shown in 
Appendix H.  
Validating the Measurement Model 
 The overall fit of the measurement model was validated during the CFA, by 
establishing the measurement relationships between items and constructs, based on the 
path estimates, standardized loadings, and standardized residuals. The CFA results 
supported the measurement model with a sample size of 380. The model fit was 
established with a χ2 of 1.916, CFI of 0.955, SRMR of 0.543, and RMSEA of 0.049. All 
the standardized loading estimates exceeded the rules of thumb, that loadings should be a 
least 0.5, with 0.7 being more ideal (Hair et al., 2010). Six indicators were below the 0.7 
thresholds. However, only one indicator, PSUS4 yielded a loading below 0.6 with a value 
of 0.0583 and was considered for deletion, moving into the structural model. All loadings 
were significant at a p <.01.  
 The construct validity of the measurement model was also tested during CFA. 
The results indicated that construct validity as a measure of convergent and discriminant 
validity was established. As shown in Table 7, the AVE, the summary indicator of 
convergence for all constructs were above the standard guideline of 0.50, the MSV was 
less than the AVE for all constructs, and the square root of AVE for each construct was 
greater than the inter-construct correlations, indicating the factors converge well on the 
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latent constructs. Evidence of discriminant validity specified that the constructs are 
unique and dissimilar to other constructs. The composite reliability of all but one 
constructs was above .80, with safeguarding measure cost (SMC) yielding the lowest CR 
of .776. This is much greater than the recommended value of .70 (Nunnally, 1978), 
indicating evidence of internal consistency.  
Table 7  
CFA Reliability, Correlation Matrix and AVEs for Constructs 
  
 As the specification of residual terms (E) stipulates, responses to items are 
influenced by factors other than the hypothesized latent constructs, which may correlate. 
For instance, the residual terms E1 and E5 covaried since they are associated with items 
that are very closely worded. Founded on comparable theoretical reasoning, a nonzero 
covariance also existed between E6 and E7, E12 and E13, and E14 and E17. As such, it 
seems theoretically justifiable to modify the measurement model to all residual terms of 
corresponding user security behavior self-concept items to freely covary. These 
relationships increased the model fit by placing fewer restrictions on parameter values by 
allowing six error covariances to be freely estimated.  
 
 CR AVE MSV AB SE PSE ISKS PSUS ISE GN SMC AM 
AB 0.806 0.585 0.446 0.765                 
SE 0.893 0.626 0.162 0.403 0.792               
PSE 0.956 0.846 0.127 0.282 0.037 0.920             
ISKS 0.881 0.656 0.211 0.348 0.168 0.191 0.810           
PSUS 0.867 0.626 0.269 0.476 -0.028 0.291 0.206 0.791         
ISE 0.813 0.525 0.283 0.361 0.081 0.200 0.068 0.519 0.725       
GN 0.868 0.692 0.146 0.382 0.268 0.115 0.361 0.198 0.154 0.832     
SMC 0.776 0.540 0.283 0.282 0.071 0.194 -0.066 0.465 0.532 0.150 0.735   
AM 0.932 0.823 0.446 0.668 0.230 0.357 0.459 0.382 0.290 0.379 0.217 0.907 
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Structural Equation Modeling   
The focus in SEM is to assess the overall and relative fit of the model and the 
structural dependence relationship between the hypothesized paths, as established by the 
structural parameter estimates, between the constructs in the path diagram. SEM provides 
a method to examine the relationships between latent constructs with a focus on the 
nature and magnitude of the relationships, in a structural model. The structural 
relationship between the constructs of a structural model provides an empirical 
representation by the structural parameter estimate, identified as a path estimate (Hair et 
al., 2010). The professional virtual community displays 35 measured indicator variables 
and eight latent constructs. All constructs correlated with each other, however, each 
indicator loaded on only one construct. The error terms can correlate only with measures 
on the same construct. Adhering to the rule of thumb, with a recommendation of a 
minimum of three indicators per constructs (Hair et al. 2010), four constructs were 
measured with four items, three constructs were measured with three items, and one 
construct was measured with five items.   
 The measures of the model are all hypothesized as reflective, with the direction of 
causality moving from the latent construct to the measured items. Seven constructs (self-
efficacy, safeguarding measure cost, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, 
information security knowledge sharing, information security experience, and group 
norms) are identified as exogenous, and two constructs (avoidance motivation and 
avoidance behavior) are endogenous. Avoidance motivation operates as both an 
exogenous (independent) construct, as it influences avoidance behavior and an 
endogenous (dependent) construct, having a causal relationship with several independent 
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factors. The PVC user behavior theory is tested by evaluating the effects of the 
exogenous constructs on the endogenous constructs. The structural model testing was 
done using a two-step SEM procedure in AMOS. First, the fit and construct validity of 
the proposed measurement model was tested, followed by the structural theory. The unit 
of analysis for this study was individual; hence, the analysis was done with individual 
responses with a sample size of 380.  
Assessing Multicollinearity 
The first step in evaluating the complete structural model in SEM was to assess 
multicollinearity, high level of correlations among the latent exogenous variables. 
Managing multicollinearity is essential when two or more variables is predicting another 
variable. The variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostics for multicollinearity was 
calculated for each predictor. A VIF equal to or less than 3 is considered acceptable   
(Hair et al., 2014). Table 8 indicates that the tolerance for all constructs was greater than 
.20 and the VIF of all constructs was below 3.0, indicating that there is a lack of 
collinearity among the predictors. In this case, there will be no impact of collinearity on 
the cause and effect relationships in the PVC model.  
Table 8  
Collinearity Assessment 
Constants  Tolerance VIF 
SMC .636 1.571 
PSE .908 1.101 
ISKS .901 1.109 
PSUS .528 1.892 
ISE .460 2.174 
GN .832 1.202 
SE .831 1.204 
AM .797 1.202 
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Assessing the Structural Model Fit 
The final stage in the SEM process is to evaluate the validity of the structural 
model by assessing the fit between the observed data and the hypothesized model. This 
process involves replacing the nonstructural covariances among latent factors with the 
hypothesized path, as shown in Appendix J. In the SEM process, there is an evaluation of 
the degree of divergence between the observed and estimated covariance matrices as well 
as the model’s parameters. The statistical significance of each hypothesized path was also 
evaluated to determine whether the specified paths were supported. The difference 
between an observed covariance matrix and the parameter estimates are used to 
approximate the population discrepancy (Mueller, & Hancock, 2008).   
As in the CFA measurement model testing, the fit indices for the structural model 
include absolute fit, incremental fit, and the model χ2. The Absolute fit indices, RMSEA, 
SRMR, and the chi-square test assess the overall fit as a measure of the discrepancy 
between observed and implied covariance matrices.  The results for the structural model 
fit indicate a chi-square value of 1.998, which is below the recommended cutoff of <3. 
The RMSEA value of 0.051 is also within the acceptable threshold of model fit, while the 
SRMR yielded .065, which is also below the cutoff. The incremental fit indices assess the 
absolute or parsimonious fit against a null model. The incremental fit statistics CFI, NFI, 
and IF with 0.950, 0.906, and 0.951 respectively, all demonstrate evidence of adequate 
structural fit. The parsimonious indices assess the overall model fit as a measure of the 
discrepancy between observed and implied covariance based on the complexity of the 
model. As valid parameters are added to a model, the fit increased. The AGFI statistic of 
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.874 exceeds the >.80 threshold, hence indicting evidence of good fit, as illustrated in 
Table 9.  
 
Table 9 
 Structural Model Fit Indices  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The structural model indices results indicate good model fitment. However, 
AMOS often offers information on change relationships to improve the model. In SEM, 
alternate models should be evaluated to appraise the extent to which the hypothesized 
path diagram model is optimal (Shumacker & Lomax, 2010). Hence the modification 
indices were examined to test for a local misfit. Modification indices indicate how a 
model fit would improve by dropping the chi-square value if the parameters were free, 
rather than constrained. Respecification from the residuals and modification indices was 
of freezing e3e34. This would only slightly improve the model fit chi-square. After 
adding the suggested relationship, the chi-squared to the degree of freedom improved to 
1.967. The other matrices were unchanged, except for the NFI and CFI, which increased 
by 0.001. 
However, it was not theoretically justifiable to covary the items SE3 and 
avoidance motivation. Brown (2015) posited that there should be a good justification for 
 Metric 
Indices 
Acceptable 
value 
Structural 
Model Fit 
Reflection  
Chi-square (χ2) Chi-square/df ≤ 3.00 1.998 Good Fit 
Absolute Fit 
Measures 
RMSEA  
RMR 
SRMR 
≤ 0.06 
≤ 1.00 
≤ 0.08 
0.051 
0.075 
0.654 
Good Fit 
Good Fit 
Good Fit 
Incremental Fit 
Indices 
CFI 
NFI 
IFI 
≥ 0.95 
≥ 0.90 
≥ 0.90 
0.951 
0.906 
0.951 
Good Fit 
Good Fit 
Good Fit 
Parsimony Fit 
Indices 
AGFI 
  
≥ 0.80 0.874 Good Fit 
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adding correlated errors between some indicators of the model constructs and not to just 
reach the cut-offs for good model fit. Therefore, no further adjustments to the 
measurement model were necessary. The structural model represented in Appendix J was 
accepted as the optimal model.  
According to Hair et al. (2014), based on the significant difference in the chi-
square value between the structural and the CFA, the possibility of another meaningful 
structural path should be considered, especially if other diagnostics matrices indicates a 
particular relationship. However, aligned with the study of Mueller and Hancock (2008), 
respecification must have strong theoretical and empirical support. If data and or 
theoretical justifications directly motivate respecification, the modified model must be 
viewed as exploratory, and may not lead to a model that is based on reality. For this 
study, all the fit statistics supported the PVC structural model, with no significant 
variations in the other fit indices between the CFA and the structural model.  
Comparison of the structural model with CFA measurement model 
The professional virtual community structural model represented as the optimal 
model in Figure 12 reflected a χ2 of 915.130 with 458 degrees of freedom (p <.05), and 
the normed chi-square of 1.998. The model CFI is .950 with an RMSEA of .051. All 
these statistics are within the recommended range for good model fit. A comparison of 
the structural model with the CFA, as shown in Figure 13, indicates a small change in the 
overall model fit between the two models. The only significant change was in a chi-
square increase of 47.034 and a variance of five degrees of freedom. A comparison of the 
factor loadings as shown in Appendix L of the CFA and the PVC structural model also 
reflected an insignificant change, with most of the changes within a range of + or - .001-
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.005, indicating a level of parameter stability among the measured variables and further 
supports the validity of the measurement model.  
Examining the structural path estimates shown in Figure 5, all but two are 
significant, and one is in the wrong direction.  The AVE of the PVC model was also 
good. As indicated in Table 10, the path estimates for both SMC - à AM and ISE + à 
AM are higher than the value for which the p-value less than or equal to α is considered 
statistically significant. Consequently, despite the estimates of ISE + à AM is in the 
right direction according to the hypothesis, it is not supported. The path for SMC - à 
AM is in the wrong direction of the hypothesis and have a p-value that is greater than the 
α of a type 1 error of 0.05, the result is not significant, and hence we failed to reject the 
hypothesized path. However, on the basis that six of the eight standardized parameter 
estimates are consistent with the hypotheses, the theoretical model is supported. This 
indicates that the PVC model has good explanatory power, robustness, and ruggedness, 
and is influential for both academics and practitioners. 
 
Table 10  
Results of the Structural Model Hypotheses Test 
Hypothesis (with 
Direction)  
Standardized 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value Supported? 
H1: SMC à AM (-) 0.085 0.120 1.29 0.197 Not supported 
H2: PSUS à AM (+) 0.143 0.070 2.18 0.029 Supported 
H3: PSE à AM (+) 0.198 0.038 4.24 0.000 Supported 
H4: ISKS à AM (+) 0.394 0.051 8.15 0.000 Supported 
H5: ISE à AM (+) 0.113 0.072 1.51 0.129 Not Supported 
H6: GN à AB (+) 0.102 0.050 2.08 0.037 Supported 
H7: SE à AB (+) 0.250 0.044 4.67 0.000 Supported 
H8: AM à AB (+) 0.597 0.045 9.48 0.000 Supported 
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Figure 5: Results of the PVC Technology Threat Avoidance Structural Model Analysis 
 
Discussion  
This study empirically investigated the factors which motivate professional virtual 
community members to engage in avoidance motivation against technology threats, 
particularly malware. The researcher validates a research model derived from the 
substantial features in the technology threat avoidance theory, the involvement theory, 
and the social cognitive theory using quantitative survey data. Self-efficacy, perceived 
susceptibility, perceived severity, information security knowledge sharing, and group 
norms show not only users’ motivation but also their information security avoidance 
behavior. Information security avoidance behavior offers a critical role in mitigating the 
risk of technology threats (Liang & Xue, 2009). The results of the structural model 
testing indicate strong support for a professional virtual community technology threat 
avoidance model (PVCTTAM) that contextualizes the integration of the technology 
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threat, social cognitive, and involvement theories into the technology threat avoidance 
literature.  
The findings of the statistical tests showed that the path from perceived 
susceptibility (β = 1.43, p = .029), perceive severity (β = 0.198, p = 0.000), information 
security knowledge sharing (β = 0.394, p = 0.000), had a significant positive predicting 
effect towards avoidance motivation. The results also proved the path from self-efficacy 
(β = 0.250, p = 0.000) and group norms (β = 0.102, p = 0.037) had a significant positive 
predicting effect on avoidance behavior. The results further indicated that the relationship 
between safeguarding measure (β = 0.085, p = 0.197) and avoidance motivation as well 
as information security experience (β =0.113, p = 0.129) on avoidance motivation are not 
significant, therefore hypotheses H1 and H5 were unsupported. Finally, the results 
revealed a strong relationship between avoidance motivation (β = 0.597, p = 0.000) and 
avoidance behavior.   
The structural model data analysis results indicated that the model accounts for a 
significant amount of variance in users’ motivation to avoid IT threats at 37 percent and 
50 percent in avoidance (actual) behavior. This study reveals that to motivate 
professional virtual community users to avoid technology threats they must be convinced 
that there is a security threat, that the threat is severe, and that users have the skills and 
ability to engage in information security protection actions. If users do not perceive that a 
threat exists, they will not be motivated to act. Also, PVC users are motivated to share 
information security threats and solution within the community. This knowledge sharing 
process further motivates users to act against information security threats. Furthermore, 
this study demonstrates that the group norms of the community also motivate users to 
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engage in information security protection behavior. This study also revealed that prior 
experience with information security threat did not motivate users to avoid future threats 
in a professional virtual environment.  
Interestingly, while many IS studies found that both perceived severity and 
perceived susceptibility have a significant predicting effect on avoidance motivation, in 
this study, information security knowledge sharing (ISKS) was the strongest predictor of 
avoidance motivation. While elements of ISKS in the involvement theory posits to 
motivate users to take actions, TTAT or other security avoidance theories such as PMT 
does not position the construct as a central component of threat avoidance. However, as 
the study was conducted in a professional virtual community environment, which 
encourages knowledge sharing and where users may have experienced a great deal of 
encouragement to adopt security measures, this disclosure factor may have influenced the 
data, resulting in the heightened level of information security knowledge sharing on 
avoidance motivation.  
There was a lack of support for H1 and H5, which examines safeguarding measure 
cost and information security experience, respectively. Though not consistent with TTAT 
and involvement theories, the results are not unique. According to Janz and Becker 
(1984), it is essential to take into account the nature of the cost, when measuring 
safeguarding measure cost. In measuring information security experience, the severity of 
the experience is an essential factor (Dupuis, Crossler, and Endicott-Popovsky, 2012). 
The measures of this study did account for the nature of the cost or the severity of 
information security experience. 
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Summary  
This chapter presents an overview and the findings of the primary data collected 
from the survey, and its measurement and structural analysis, using a CFA and SEM 
multistep statistical process. Also, the survey validation process, including an expert 
panel review and a pilot study was presented. The data and its analysis provide evidence 
of the significance of the relationships tested in the model. The internal consistency, 
convergent validity, and discriminant validity were established with values for reliability 
above 0.70, values for AVE above 0.50, and MSV values were less that AVE.  
Three items were eliminated from the model based on the initial reliability and 
validity testing results. The refined model was later tested as the CFA measurement 
model and the structural model. Both the CFA and the SEM model testing demonstrated 
a good fit. The model fit was established based on the chi-square, absolute fit, 
incremental fit, and parsimonious fit indices. The final model was then discussed 
theoretically based on the literature associated with the constructs of the model. The 
PVCTTAM model was accepted as optimal in this study, with empirical evidence of 
statistical significance. However, it is understood that this model is not unique and other 
statistical significance results could be presented from varying relationships among the 
constructs in the model, if analyzed in other scenarios, such as in a different virtual 
environment.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Overview  
Professional virtual communities have become a conduit for knowledge exchange 
and professional opportunities for individuals and organizations. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that there is an increase in the number of information security breaches 
in recent years. This study investigated the information security behavior of users on 
LinkedIn. The core research questions focused on how factors from the TTAT, SCT, and 
Involvement theory motivate LinkedIn users to engage in information security avoidance 
behavior. Through a self-reported survey, this study established that factors such as self-
efficacy, safeguarding measure cost, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity 
information sharing, experience, and group norms predict LinkedIn users’ technology 
threat avoidance motivation and behavior. These factors were explored in an integrated 
PVC model. The structural model presented in Appendix J was accepted as the optimal 
(statistically significant) model, after the reliability, validity, CFA measurement, 
structural model testing and a comparison of the CFA and the structural model. Other 
relationships are also possible to derive model fit and may reveal statistical significance 
in future studies. 
This chapter presents the conclusions that were derived from this study. The 
conclusions are presented through the tests of the research questions and the hypotheses. 
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This chapter also presents the implications of the research to the IS body of knowledge 
and recommendations for further research.   
 
Reporting on the Hypotheses  
The professional virtual community user model tested the following hypotheses:  
H1: Safeguarding measure cost to protect against technology threats is negatively 
related to avoidance motivation. 
H2: Perceived susceptibility of being attacked by malicious technology threats is 
positively related to avoidance motivation. 
H3: Perceived severity of being attacked by malicious technology threats is 
positively related to avoidance motivation. 
H4: Information security knowledge sharing is positively related to users’ 
avoidance motivation.  
H5: Information security experience is positively related to users’ avoidance 
motivation. 
H6: Group norms is positively related to technology threat avoidance behavior.   
H7: Self-efficacy to protect against technology threats is positively related to 
avoidance behavior. 
H8: Avoidance motivation is positively related to avoidance behavior to protect 
against technology threats using the safeguard measures.  
Regarding hypothesis H1: Safeguarding measure cost to protect against technology 
threats is negatively related to avoidance motivation, was not supported. Liang and Xue 
(2010) posited that safeguarding measure cost tends to generate barriers to behavior and 
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reduce behavioral motivation. Therefore, a user’s motivation to avoid a security threat 
must be weighed against the expected cost, as users are less likely to take a safeguarding 
measure if the costs outweigh the benefits. This study did not confirm Liang and Xue’s 
(2010) theory; however, this study is not unique. Based on the data, it may be interpreted 
that users must perceive the cost to undertake security measures as extreme, for it to be a 
barrier to avoidance motivation. This study measurement did not account for the severity 
of the safeguarding measure cost.  
Janz and Becker (1984) argued that users would not be motivated to engage in 
security behavior if the cost is too high. Liang and Xue (2009) also supported this 
concept in the initial TTAT. They posited that the effects of safeguarding measure cost 
are mediated by perceived avoidability. Furthermore, according to Becker (1993), an 
individual’s actions are influenced by the perceived cost, compared with perceived 
benefits. However, the costs and benefits of alternative options are subjective, as it relates 
to the decision-maker. Also, McCarthy (2002) indicated that cost is not always related to 
financial factors, as such a decision maker may consider diverse interests such as cultural, 
social, psychological, or emotional interests during a cost-benefit analysis. These 
mediating factors were omitted from this study and possibly could have affected the 
result of the hypothesis.  
The second hypothesis in this study H2: Perceived susceptibility of being attacked 
by malicious technology threats is positively related to avoidance motivation, was 
supported by the data. Several research studies (Aurigemma & Panko, 2012; Giwah, 
2018; Humaidi & Balakrishnan, 2015; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2009; 
Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng & Xu, 2009;) have proposed perceived susceptibility as a critical 
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factor in security behavior. Johnston and Warkentin (2010), highlighted that as an 
individual becomes conscious of a threat, he or she will establish an opinion of the 
seriousness of the threat and the probability of experiencing the threat. Similarly, Rogers 
(1983) established that perceived susceptibility is an important factor that impacts an 
individual’s reaction to threats.  
The third hypothesis H3: Perceived severity of being attacked by malicious 
technology threats is positively related to avoidance motivation, was supported by the 
data. The relationship between severity and threat is strongly supported by health 
psychology and risk analysis literature and has been growing steadily in the information 
systems and security domain.  For instance, the health belief model and the protection 
motivation theory posit that people are motivated to engage in protective measures if 
there is a perceived health threat (Janz & Becker, 1984; Rosenstock, 1974). Similarity, IT 
studies such as (Ng et al., 2009; Workman et al., 2008) indicate that perceived 
susceptibility affects users’ IT security behavior. 
 The fourth hypothesis, H4: Information security knowledge sharing is positively 
related to users’ avoidance motivation, was supported by this study. While knowledge 
sharing has been tested as a construct in IS literature in organizations, it is a relatively 
new concept in the context of avoidance motivation in response to user information 
security behavior on an individual level. This study supports Tamjidyamcholo and Baba’s 
(2014) investigation of the effect of information security knowledge sharing in virtual 
communities and its effect on reducing risk. They revealed that a low level of knowledge 
sharing in a virtual environment is an important barrier in information security. This 
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finding is in line with the results of the study conducted by Arachcilage and Love (2014), 
which revealed that users’ knowledge prevents security threats.  
 The fifth hypothesis, H5: Information security experience is positively related to 
users’ avoidance motivation, was not supported. One likely explanation for this finding 
might be related to the perceived impact of frequency and correlation with severity of 
past experiences (Dupuis, Crossler, & Endicott-Popovsky, 2012). Dupuis et al. (2012) 
argued that for past security threat to influence future actions, the user must have 
perceived the past threat to have had a significant damaging effect and or the threat must 
have occurred more than once. This study did not account for the frequency in which 
PVC users may have experienced a technology threat or the severity of the past threat.  
 The sixth hypothesis, H6: Group norms are positively related to technology threat 
avoidance behavior, was supported by the data. This finding is aligned with previous 
studies that indicate that group norms in virtual communities have a substantial and 
significant predicting effect on group members’ attitudes and behavior (Hogg & Terry, 
2000; Terry & Hogg, 1996). Group norms assist in forming the identity of the group and 
in shaping users’ acceptance of new ideas and concepts, hence in PVCs, group members 
can be influenced to engage in information security avoidance behavior.   
The seventh hypothesis, H7: Self-efficacy to protect against technology threats is 
positively related to avoidance behavior, was supported. This result is consistent with 
Bandura’s (1982, p. 140) proposition that “in any given instance, behavior would be best 
predicted by considering both self-efficacy and outcome beliefs.” Also, prior research 
indicated that as users’ level of self-efficacy increases, they are more inclined to engage 
in IT security behavior (Ng et al., 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008). 
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The final hypothesis, H8: Avoidance motivation is positively related to avoidance 
behavior to protect against technology threats using the safeguard measures, was 
supported. This finding is consistent with cognitive theorists (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; 
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and IS literature (Liang & Xue, 2010; Venkatesh et al., 2003), 
who argued that behavioral intention is a strong predictor of actual behavior. 
 
Implications 
Professional virtual communities continue to grow in popularity. It signals a 
uniqueness in the online environment for innovation and professional exploration. 
Members on professional networks create and share in-depth professional profiles 
highlighting the current and past work experience, education, and other activities about 
their professional lives. Members join professional groups, share endorsements, and 
engage in career management. Strategizing privacy management has been presented as a 
practical approach to mitigating security breaches in social media (Madden, 2012). 
However, as PVCs are driven by information sharing, reducing the potential for sharing 
could potentially negatively affect the social environment. This research seeks to 
augment and diversify research on user information security behavior in PVCs via the 
TTAT, SCT, and involvement theories. This study examines individual users’ technology 
threat avoidance in the context of PVCs, as users are susceptible to security breaches. 
 The results of this study have implications for practice as they appraise the 
professional virtual community industry and organizations that the solution to technology 
threat avoidance in PVCs should not be based on an individualistic culture, but must be 
tackled through an integrated approach. While organizations can and usually develop and 
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implement security policies and procedures to regulate employees’ security behavior 
(Gordon et al., 2006), individual users without a centralized regulation, engage in 
voluntary protective actions and are likely to become easy targets for IT threats.  
Self-efficacy skills, information security knowledge sharing, group norms are 
essential factors capable of motivating users to engage in security threat avoidance 
motivation that can improve the overall security of the community. The findings of this 
study provide several important practical implications. Firstly, this study contributes to 
the field of information systems by developing an integrated model based on constructs 
from well-established theories for explaining user information security behavior in 
professional virtual communities. The model adopted aspects of two theories from the 
domains of social psychology and marketing and integrated it with a theory from IS 
domain.  
While technology threats and security breaches in virtual environments continue 
to rise, the literature is lacking in theory-based empirical research that explains users’ 
voluntary IT threat avoidance behavior (Liang & Xue, 2010). Prior studies focus mainly 
on users’ behavior in organizational settings where security policies are standardized 
(D'Arcy et al., 2009; Straub & Welke, 1998) and where IT users appear to be more 
compliant. These studies emphasize the use of information security organizational 
policies to coerced employees to engage in security behavior. However, in PVCs, where 
technology threat avoidance is voluntary, this method is not practicable. Additionally, 
while some studies examine users’ security behavior on social networking sites (SNS), 
they mainly focus on privacy and disclosure (Saridakis et al., 2016). This study fills the 
gap in the literature by offering an understanding of professional virtual community 
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individual users’ technology threat avoidance behavior, through an integrated approach. 
This study offers methods for voluntary security avoidance and behavior at the individual 
level, in the context of PVCs.  
Secondly, this study confirms the predicting effect of perceived severity and 
perceived susceptibility and the importance of self-efficacy, information knowledge 
sharing, and group norms in technology threat avoidance. PVC users will be motivated to 
engage in avoidance behavior if they perceived that there is a risk of being attacked. The 
higher the risk, the more likely users will take actions to avoid a technology threat. 
Similarly, PVC users with high self-efficacy will be more motivated to engage in 
technology threat avoidance behavior. This is significant as there is a need for additional 
understandings into threat and efficacy in the information security domain, as suggested 
by PMT and FAM (Liang & Xue, 2010). 
Thirdly, technology threats can be mitigated by increasing Information security 
knowledge sharing in professional virtual communities. While information sharing is a 
predominant feature in PVCs, the results reveal that extending information sharing to 
include security threats and security solutions will motivate other users to avoid 
technology threats as they develop threat awareness, perform a cost-benefit analysis, 
increase self-efficacy and ultimately engage in security avoidance behavior. Information 
security knowledge security in PVCs not only raises the awareness of treats but 
demonstrates the importance of engaging in avoidance behavior. Fourthly, group norms 
in professional virtual communities play a significant role in technology threat avoidance 
behavior. When PVC users embrace an attitude of threat avoidance, by encouraging 
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activities that benefit the security of the community, individual users are more motivated 
to engage in avoidance behavior. 
Study Limitations  
 The results of this study need to be construed within the context of the limitations 
of the study. First, the population of the study was LinkedIn members. While LinkedIn is 
the largest, most popular professional virtual community, it is not the sole one. Studying 
a single PVC may affect the generalization of the study. The generalization of the study 
may increase by surveying other PVCs. Second, the data were collected via a self-
reporting survey. People often believe others are more likely to be attacked by technology 
threats than themselves. Also, without direct observation of users’ security actions,  as 
well as the researcher’s inability to control the study environment, it is uncertain if these 
data are accurate or unbiased. The survey may be affected by introspective ability, the 
ability of respondents to provide accurate responses to questions, based on their 
perception of standards.  
Third, while the survey instrument was assessed for reliability and validity, it may 
not account for minor differences or the range of perceived skills or perceived threats. 
Another limitation is that the study can only measure technology threats that are known 
to the PVC users surveyed in this study. Additionally, high intercorrelations among the 
measurement items might suggest that the items are “overly redundant and the construct 
measured too specific” (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, p. 114). The Cronbach’s Alpha for the 
construct perceived severity was .960. This high Cronbach’s Alpha may compromise the 
content validity of the instrument, as only a portion of the construct was tested 
repeatedly. Finally, with the use of SEM analysis, the case of various modified models 
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are possible. Therefore, different researchers may generate different SEM or path 
analysis models, even with the same data and the same research model.  
 
Recommendations 
 This study provides a testable concept that can be further explored. While users in 
PVCs engage in voluntary technology threat avoidance on an individual level. Individuals 
usually share an extensive amount of information about their past and current employers. 
Therefore, these organizations are exposed to as much risk as individual users. Hence, 
further studies may examine the impacts of individual users’ information security 
behavior on organizations. Further studies may also explore the roles of organizations in 
providing training and awareness of technology threats for their employees (individual 
users), as well as appropriate security behavior concerning virtual communities.  
As group norms is established to be a critical factor for technology threat 
avoidance in PVCs, further studies can investigate the impacts of security regulations and 
standardized policies and procedures for user security behavior in professional virtual 
communities. The role of PVC executives, administrators, and governments in 
establishing user security behavior regulations for PVCs might also be a subject for 
further research. Additionally, for future studies, survey design and analysis may wish to 
include mediating constructs and items regarding the severity of past technology threats 
and the range of cost associated with safeguarding measure cost to determine at what 
point users believe a cost outweighs the benefits of security behavior.  
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Summary 
 This study addressed the rise in security breaches in professional virtual 
communities, while users continue to engage in unsafe computing practices. Previous 
studies focus more on understanding the home computer usage and compliance in 
organizations, and their associated security risks (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Dang-
Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Li & Siponen, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010). While studies 
on social networking sites have been done, they focus mainly and users’ privacy and 
disclosure concerns, adding to the dearth in the literature of studies on security threats in 
PVC, especially at the individual level.  
 The goal of this study is to validate empirically the avoidance motivation factors 
that influence users’ information security behavior in professional virtual communities. 
The goal was established after a thorough review of the literature. This study is an 
attempt to fill the gap in the literature by investigating user security behavior in PVCs 
and how to motivate individual users to engage in technology threats avoidance behavior, 
through an integrated approach. To address the goals of the study, eight hypotheses were 
formulated and tested. Nine constructs were examined: self-efficacy, safeguarding 
measure cost, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, information security 
knowledge sharing, information security experience, group norms, avoidance motivation, 
and avoidance behavior.  The research was able to confirm the factors from the TTAT, 
SCT, and involvement theory that motivates users to engage in security avoidance 
behavior.   
 A quantitative method was used to investigate the hypotheses. Data were 
collected via a web-based survey from 388 LinkedIn members. The survey was 
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constructed by adapting items from previous research. The survey had a total of 42 
questions, 36 representing the nine constructs and six demographic questions. Except for 
the demographics, all items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale. A panel of 
experts validated the survey instrument. The items were modified based on the feedback 
of the expert panel. The instrument was reviewed and modified until the experts reached 
a consensus on the content. Before conducting the main survey, a small pilot study was 
conducted to ensure the validity of the survey (Sekaran, 2003; Zikmund, 1988) and to 
detect further errors, process, and feasibility of the main study. Twenty-two LinkedIn 
members participated in the pilot study. Minor changes were made to the instrument after 
the analysis of the pilot data.  
 Checkmarket.com hosted the survey. The instrument was distributed via email, 
SMS, social media, and QR code to 1285 LinkedIn members. The qualifying factors for 
the survey were age and membership. All respondents were older than 18 and had a 
LinkedIn account. Three hundred eighty-eight participants responded to the study, 
yielding an acceptable response rate of 30% (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Of the 388 
respondents, 380 completed the survey.   
 Before analyzing the data, a pre-analysis screening was performed to detect 
abnormalities (Mertler & Vannatta, 2009). The data were checked for missing data, 
skewness, and kurtosis. Eight surveys had missing data. Those data were deleted based 
on the listwise deletion method. The data were assumed to be missing completely at 
random (MCAR). The data were accepted as normal, with no outliers. The data were then 
analyzed for composite reliability and validity using Cronbach Alpha’s in IBM SPSS. 
Internal consistency and validity were established for all the constructs with a Cronbach 
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Alpha above the recommended value of 0.70 (Cronbach, 1951). However, the AVE for 
two items was low, SMC4 and GN4 were dropped from the instrument.  
 The measurement model was then evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis to 
explore the relationships among the variables in the model. The maximum likelihood 
method in IBM Amos version 25 was used to estimate the models’ parameters. The PVC 
model established a good model fit. Modifications were made to the CFA model, based 
on the recommended modification indices. Six covariances were established between the 
error variance for specified indicators. These relationships increased the overall model fit 
of the measurement model by placing fewer restrictions on parameter values by allowing 
six error covariances to be freely estimated. The internal reliability, convergent validity, 
and discriminant validity of the instrument were assessed. All the constructs 
demonstrated results above 0.70, AVE above 0.50, and the AVE exceeds the MSV for 
each construct. 
The structural model was then assessed using SEM to evaluate the overall and 
relative fit of the model and the relationship between the hypothesized paths. All the 
measures of the model were reflective, with the direction of the casualty from the latent 
construct to the measured items. Seven constructs (self-efficacy, safeguarding measure 
cost, perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, information security knowledge 
sharing, information security experience, and group norms) were identified as exogenous 
and two constructs (avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior) as endogenous. 
Avoidance motivation operates as both an exogenous (independent) construct and an 
endogenous (dependent) construct. The first step with SEM was to test for 
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multicollinearity. The analysis revealed a lack of collinearity among the predictors as the 
tolerance for all constructs were more significant than 0.20 and the VIF below 3.0. 
The analysis of the structural model indicated a good model fit. Model fit was 
established using the chi-square, normed chi-square, absolute fit, incremental fit, and 
parsimonious fit. All model fit indices were within the acceptable threshold and indicated 
goodness-of-fit. The path estimates and R2 for the endogenous variables were also 
analyzed. From this analysis, it was noted that all, but two relationships were supported. 
One path was not statistically significant at a significance level <0.05, while one 
relationship was in the wrong direction. Information security knowledge sharing had the 
most significant effect on avoidance motivation. The results also indicate that avoidance 
motivation had a substantial predicting effect on avoidance behavior. The coefficient of 
determination for the endogenous variables of 87% illustrates a good fit between the 
model and the data. The structural model was also compared against the CFA; the model 
fit indices between the two models were very close, indicating stability in the model. The 
structural model was confirmed as optimal. However, this study acknowledges that other 
models and representation of the relationships between the constructs may also yield a 
good model fit.  
This research study concluded with a discussion of the findings, limitations that 
may impact the generalizability of the study, the implications for the IS domain, and 
recommendations for further studies.  
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Appendix A 
 
Survey on measuring User Information Security Behavior on LinkedIn 
 
NSU Consent to be in a Research Study Entitled  
 
User Information Security Behavior in Professional Virtual Communities:  
A Technology Threat Avoidance Approach   
 
Dear Participant:  
 
I am Vivienne Forrester, a doctoral candidate with the College of Engineering and 
Computing at Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. I am working 
under the supervision of Dr. Ling Wang. For my doctoral research, I am examining user 
information security behavior in professional virtual communities (PVCs). For this 
study, a PVC refers to LinkedIn. You are being asked to participate in this research study 
because you are an adult (18 or older) member of the LinkedIn online social network. 
You will be taking a one-time, anonymous online survey. The survey will take 
approximately eight minutes to complete.   
 
There is no cost for participation in this study, nor is there any payment. All responses to 
the survey are completely anonymous, and the study will not collect any personally 
identifiable information. Information provided will be handled confidentially. There are 
no foreseeable risks linked with your participating in this study. Participation in the 
research is voluntary. You can decide not to participate, and you can exit the survey at 
any time.   
 
Completion and return of the survey will indicate your willingness to participate in this 
study. If you have questions, you can contact Vivienne Forrester at 
fvivienn@mynsu.nova.edu or Dr. Wang at lwang@nova.edu. If you have questions 
about the study but want to talk to someone who is not a part of the study, you can call 
the Nova Southeastern University Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (954) 262-5369 
or toll-free at 1-866-499-0790 or email at IRB@nova.edu.  
 
If you have read the above information and voluntarily wish to participate in this 
research study, please click the “Start” button below to access the survey. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Vivienne Forrester 
fvivienne@mynsu.nova.edu   
 
 
 Powered by CheckMarket 
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  General information  
1. Age  
 ¡ 18-25 years  
 ¡ 26-35 years  
 ¡ 36-45 years  
 ¡ 46-55 years  
 ¡ 56-65 years  
 ¡ Older than 65  
   
2. Gender:  
 ¡ Male  
 ¡ Female  
 ¡ Other, please specify 
............................................................ 
 
   
 LinkedIn Expereince  
3. How long have you been using LinkedIn?  
 ¡ Less than 1 year  
 ¡ 1 - 2 years  
 ¡ 3 - 5 years  
 ¡ Over five years 
 
 
4. How often do you use LinkedIn?  
 ¡ Regularly (Daily)  
 ¡ Frequently (At least once per week)  
 ¡ Occasionally (At least once per month)  
 ¡ Seldom (At least once every six months)  
 ¡ Rarely (at least once per year)  
 ¡ Other, please specify 
............................................................ 
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Self-efficacy  
* Please indicate your level of confidence in executing the following tasks.  
  1 
Not at All 
Confident 
2 
Slightly 
Confident 
3 
Somewhat 
Confident 
4 
Moderately 
Confident 
5 
Very 
Confident 
SE1. I can easily enable 
security features on 
LinkedIn by myself. 
          
SE2. I can correctly 
install security software 
on my computer. 
          
SE3. I can use different 
security software to 
protect my information 
          
SE4. I can configure my 
web browser security 
settings. 
          
SE5. I can easily find 
information on how to 
secure my profile on 
LinkedIn. 
          
 
 
  
Safeguarding Measure Cost 
 
* Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
  1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Neutral 
4 
Agree 
5 
Strongly Agree 
SMC1. Enabling security 
measures decreases the 
convenience afforded by 
LinkedIn. 
          
SMC2. Enabling security 
features on LinkedIn 
would be time-consuming. 
          
SMC3. Complying with 
the security requirements 
of LinkedIn is 
burdensome. 
          
SMC4. Security software 
may cause problems to 
other programs on my PC. 
          
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 Perceived Susceptibility   
* Please indicate the likelihood of being affected by the following security risks.  
  1 
Highly 
Unlikely 
2 
Unlikely 
3 
Somewhat 
Likely 
4 
Likely 
5 
Highly 
Likely 
PSUS1. A malware will 
infect my computer by 
visiting LinkedIn. 
          
PSUS2. My identity will be 
stolen by accessing 
LinkedIn. 
          
PSUS3. My data will be 
corrupted by visiting 
LinkedIn. 
          
PSUS4. My personal 
information on LinkedIn 
could be misused. 
          
 
 
 
  
Perceived Severity 
 
* Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
  1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Neutral 
4 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
PSE1. Having my computer 
infected by malware through 
LinkedIn is a severe problem 
for me. 
          
PSE2. Having my online 
identity stolen through 
LinkedIn is a severe problem 
for me. 
          
PSE3. Losing personal data 
because of malware through 
LinkedIn is a severe problem 
for me. 
          
PSE4. Losing organizational 
data because of malware 
through LinkedIn is a severe 
problem for me. 
          
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 Information Security Knowledge Sharing  
* Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 
   
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
ISKS1. If I find new security 
threats, I will inform 
LinkedIn members. 
          
ISKS2. If I find a solution to 
security threats, I will share 
with LinkedIn members. 
          
ISKS3. Sharing of 
information security 
knowledge with LinkedIn 
members is always 
beneficial. 
          
ISKS4. Sharing of 
information security 
knowledge with LinkedIn 
members is always valuable. 
          
 
 
 
  
Information Security Experience 
 
* Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 
   
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
ISE1. I have experience with 
my data being corrupted by 
malware. 
          
ISE2. I have experience with 
my identity being stolen 
through a cyber-attack. 
          
ISE3. I have experience with 
my computer being infected 
with malware. 
          
ISE4. I have experience with 
my personal data being 
misused through a cyber-
attack. 
          
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 Group Norms  
* Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 
  1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Neutral 
4 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
GN1. Members encourage 
action that benefit the 
security of LinkedIn. 
          
GN2. Members engage in 
activities that benefit the 
security of LinkedIn. 
          
GN3. Members take actions 
that avoid threats to the 
security of LinkedIn. 
          
GN4. Members are opposed 
to activities that may harm 
the security of LinkedIn. 
          
 
 
   
 Avoidance Motivation  
* Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 
  1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 
Disagree 
3 
Neutral 
4 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
AM1. I intend to use 
security software to avoid 
malware on LinkedIn. 
          
AM2. I plan to use security 
software to avoid malware 
on LinkedIn. 
          
AM3. I will add additional 
security measures to protect 
my information on LinkedIn. 
          
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 Avoidance Behavior   
* Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 
   
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
 
Neutral 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
AB1. I update my computer’s 
security software regularly.           
AB2. I look for a security 
icon, trust mark, or HTTPS to 
verify that LinkedIn is secure 
before logging on. 
          
AB3. I have changed the 
security settings on my 
computer that pertain to 
LinkedIn access. 
          
AB4. I add additional security 
software on my computer to 
mitigate impacts of 
information security breaches 
on LinkedIn. 
          
 
 
  
General Information 
 
* Ethnicity  
 ¡ American Indian or Alaskan Native  
 ¡ Asian  
 ¡ Black or African American  
 ¡ Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander  
 ¡ White  
 ¡ Multiple races  
 ¡ Other, please specify 
............................................................ 
 
 
* Highest level of education completed:  
 ¡ Less than a high school diploma  
 ¡ High school diploma or equivalent  
 ¡ Some College but no degree  
 ¡ Associate degree  
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 ¡ Bachelor degree  
 ¡ Graduate degree  
 ¡ Other, please specify 
............................................................ 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the survey. Your answers are important for us 
and provide valuable input for the evaluation and further development of a PVC 
Information Security Model. 
Please share the survey with your LinkedIn connections by clicking the LinkedIn button 
below! 
  
Facebook:  
Twitter:  
LinkedIn:  
WhatsApp:  
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Appendix B 
 
Intuitional Review Board Approval Memo 
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Appendix C 
 
Expert Panel Review Survey Evaluation 
Survey on measuring user information security behavior in a professional virtual 
community (PVC): LinkedIn --- (Olson, 2010) 
Instructions to Experts  
Please evaluate the survey based on the evaluation standards. Also, analyze each question 
for the characteristics of burdensome, sensitivity, and potential failures of the response 
process. 
For each question, analyze whether the characteristic measured in the question is:  
a. Burdensome—requires a great deal of cognitive work by the respondent (yes, 
no).  
b. Sensitive—requires revealing embarrassing or private information or the topic 
is not discussed in everyday conversation (yes, no). 
c. Potential failures of the response process - whether a failure of the response 
process is likely to occur at any stage. If any failure is likely to occur, please 
rate how likely a failure at each stage in the response process is to occur.  
0 = Unlikely that a failure of this stage will occur 
1 = Somewhat likely that a failure of this stage will occur  
2 = Likely that a failure of this stage will occur 
3 = Very likely that a failure of this stage will occur  
 
 Overall Survey Evaluation Standards Yes No 
1  
 
Content: 
 
Are the questions asking about the right things?
  
  
2 Are the response sets reasonable?    
3 Is the wording technically correct and 
appropriate? 
  
4  
Cognitive: 
Will all questions be understood in the same way 
by all respondents? 
  
5 Does this understanding match the intended 
purpose of the survey designer? 
  
6 Usability: Can respondents complete the survey easily and 
as they were intended? 
  
7 Structure: Does the survey flow logically?   
 
Comments, concerns, recommendations:  
You may make notes for only the questions you answered YES in any of the categories 
and any specifics relating to the evaluation standards.  
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Appendix D 
 
Pre-analysis testing with descriptive statistics, skewness, and kurtosis  
 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
SE1 380 3.461 1.2225 -.422 .125 -.690 .250 
SE2 380 3.732 1.3062 -.714 .125 -.703 .250 
SE3 380 3.421 1.3163 -.421 .125 -.924 .250 
SE4 380 3.542 1.2896 -.487 .125 -.830 .250 
SE5 380 3.555 1.2326 -.404 .125 -.867 .250 
SMC1 380 2.903 .8947 .015 .125 -.099 .250 
SMC2 380 2.884 .9866 .151 .125 -.518 .250 
SMC3 380 2.639 .9354 .348 .125 -.142 .250 
SMC4 380 2.924 1.0461 -.014 .125 -.677 .250 
PSUS1 380 2.384 1.1087 .773 .125 .052 .250 
PSUS2 380 2.550 1.0066 .416 .125 -.291 .250 
PSUS3 380 2.232 1.0035 .940 .125 .515 .250 
PSUS4 380 3.142 1.0754 .111 .125 -.637 .250 
PSE1 380 3.516 1.4038 -.521 .125 -1.048 .250 
PSE2 380 3.787 1.4177 -.819 .125 -.762 .250 
PSE3 380 3.618 1.3913 -.624 .125 -.946 .250 
PSE4 380 3.532 1.4092 -.545 .125 -1.044 .250 
ISKS1 380 3.703 1.0032 -.811 .125 .402 .250 
ISKS2 380 3.713 .9823 -.860 .125 .549 .250 
ISKS3 380 3.900 .8930 -.942 .125 1.355 .250 
ISKS4 380 3.905 .9424 -1.046 .125 1.356 .250 
ISE1 380 2.850 1.3883 .146 .125 -1.364 .250 
ISE2 380 2.234 1.2026 .849 .125 -.320 .250 
ISE3 380 3.247 1.3848 -.445 .125 -1.188 .250 
ISE4 380 2.447 1.2686 .579 .125 -.783 .250 
GN1 380 3.347 .8124 -.003 .125 .460 .250 
GN2 380 3.300 .7854 -.091 .125 .883 .250 
GN3 380 3.279 .8258 -.021 .125 .516 .250 
GN4 380 3.437 .8274 -.036 .125 .125 .250 
AM1 380 3.642 1.0418 -.509 .125 -.304 .250 
AM2 380 3.589 1.0375 -.397 .125 -.382 .250 
AM3 380 3.616 1.0272 -.439 .125 -.343 .250 
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AB1 380 3.668 1.1256 -.637 .125 -.482 .250 
AB2 380 3.629 1.1766 -.468 .125 -.929 .250 
AB3 380 2.876 1.1704 .371 .125 -.829 .250 
AB4 380 3.024 1.2142 .186 .125 -1.020 .250 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
380       
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Appendix E 
 
Scale Reliability Analysis  
 
 
Table E1: Reliability analysis of the scale of Self-efficacy (SE) 
 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.902 
N of Items 
5 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
SE1 14.250 20.125 .686 .895 
SE2 13.979 18.775 .765 .878 
SE3 14.289 18.465 .791 .872 
SE4 14.168 18.695 .788 .873 
SE5 14.155 19.477 .749 .882 
 
Table E2: Reliability analysis of the scale of safeguard measure cost (SMC) 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.769 
N of Items 
4 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
SMC1 8.447 5.689 .552 .724 
SMC2 8.466 5.020 .645 .672 
SMC3 8.711 5.256 .633 .681 
SMC4 8.426 5.469 .466 .774 
 
  Table E3: Reliability analysis of the scale of Perceived Susceptibility (PSUS) 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.870 
N of Items 
4 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
PSUS1 7.924 7.121 .731 .831 
PSUS2 7.758 7.382 .783 .811 
PSUS3 8.076 7.364 .791 .808 
PSUS4 7.166 7.896 .600 .883 
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Table E4: Reliability analysis of the scale of perceived severity (PSE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E5: Reliability analysis of the scale of Information security knowledge sharing 
(ISKS) 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.902 
N of Items 
4 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
ISKS1 11.518 6.351 .782 .874 
ISKS2 11.508 6.398 .795 .869 
ISKS3 11.321 6.831 .789 .872 
ISKS4 11.316 6.702 .763 .880 
 
Table E6: Reliability analysis of the scale of information security experience  
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.830 
N of Items 
4 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
ISE1 7.929 10.330 .674 .778 
ISE2 8.545 11.790 .610 .806 
ISE3 7.532 10.429 .663 .783 
ISE4 8.332 10.898 .688 .772 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.960 
N of Items 
4 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
PSE1 10.937 16.339 .870 .955 
PSE2 10.666 15.859 .914 .943 
PSE3 10.834 15.917 .931 .938 
PSE4 10.921 16.157 .886 .951 
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Table E7: Reliability analysis of the scale of Group Norms (GN) 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.815 
N of Items 
4 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
GN1 10.016 3.868 .710 .731 
GN2 10.063 3.817 .770 .704 
GN3 10.084 4.025 .631 .769 
GN4 9.926 4.528 .450 .851 
 
 
Table E8: Reliability analysis of the scale of Avoidance motivation (AM) 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.926 
N of Items 
3 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
AM1 7.205 3.778 .875 .872 
AM2 7.258 3.680 .918 .837 
AM3 7.232 4.168 .760 .963 
 
  Table E9: Reliability analysis of the scale of avoidance behavior (AB) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.811 
N of Items 
4 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
AB1 9.529 9.020 .554 .797 
AB2 9.568 8.494 .606 .774 
AB3 10.321 8.150 .675 .741 
AB4 10.174 7.896 .683 .736 
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Table E10: Reliability analysis of the scale user information security behavior on 
LinkedIn 
 
Cronbach's Alpha 
.908 
N of Items 
36 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
AB1 113.561 371.429 .474 .905 
AB2 113.600 368.030 .528 .904 
AB3 114.353 365.859 .581 .904 
AB4 114.205 364.607 .586 .903 
SE1 113.768 376.258 .327 .907 
SE2 113.497 373.164 .364 .907 
SE3 113.808 369.507 .435 .906 
SE4 113.687 373.086 .371 .907 
SE5 113.674 374.337 .365 .907 
SMC1 114.326 379.656 .367 .907 
SMC2 114.345 380.411 .308 .907 
SMC3 114.589 379.562 .351 .907 
SMC4 114.305 378.112 .345 .907 
PSUS1 114.845 369.620 .525 .904 
PSUS2 114.679 373.005 .494 .905 
PSUS3 114.997 373.749 .476 .905 
PSUS4 114.087 374.813 .415 .906 
PSE1 113.713 365.561 .479 .905 
PSE2 113.442 365.825 .469 .905 
PSE3 113.611 365.521 .485 .905 
PSE4 113.697 365.784 .473 .905 
ISKS1 113.526 376.398 .407 .906 
ISKS2 113.516 377.533 .386 .906 
ISKS3 113.329 376.417 .463 .906 
ISKS4 113.324 374.383 .493 .905 
ISE1 114.379 366.948 .458 .906 
ISE2 114.995 375.514 .349 .907 
ISE3 113.982 368.963 .420 .906 
ISE4 114.782 369.965 .444 .906 
GN1 113.882 379.070 .427 .906 
GN2 113.929 379.607 .425 .906 
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GN3 113.950 378.749 .430 .906 
GN4 113.792 382.281 .318 .907 
AM1 113.587 366.665 .639 .903 
AM2 113.639 366.384 .649 .903 
AM3 113.613 369.568 .573 .904 
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Appendix F 
 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructs  AVE MSV AM SE SMC PSUS PSE ISKS ISE GN AB 
AM 0.823 0.457 0.907                 
SE 0.648 0.203 0.244 0.805               
SMC 0.473 0.297 0.223 0.066 0.688             
PSUS 0.641 0.300 0.379 -0.016 0.496 0.801           
PSE 0.857 0.128 0.358 0.042 0.211 0.309 0.926         
ISKS 0.686 0.220 0.469 0.266 0.054 0.234 0.241 0.828       
ISE 0.552 0.300 0.296 0.113 0.545 0.548 0.225 0.132 0.743     
GN 0.567 0.175 0.393 0.283 0.172 0.198 0.121 0.382 0.165 0.753   
AB 0.525 0.457 0.676 0.450 0.271 0.442 0.280 0.363 0.368 0.418 0.725 
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Appendix G 
 
Measuement Theory Model for Professional Virtual Community Technology 
Threat Avoidance Model (PVCTTAM) 
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Appendix H 
CFA Model Fit Summary 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 108 868.096 453 .000 1.916 
Saturated model 561 .000 0   
Independence model 33 9700.910 528 .000 18.373 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .070 .878 .849 .709 
Saturated model .000 1.000   
Independence model .377 .272 .226 .256 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model NFI Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 CFI 
Default model .911 .896 .955 .947 .955 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .858 .781 .819 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 415.096 335.635 502.354 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 9172.910 8856.543 9495.674 
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FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 2.290 1.095 .886 1.325 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 25.596 24.203 23.368 25.055 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .049 .044 .054 .602 
Independence model .214 .210 .218 .000 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 1084.096 1105.383 1509.634 1617.634 
Saturated model 1122.000 1232.574 3332.436 3893.436 
Independence model 9766.910 9773.414 9896.936 9929.936 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 2.860 2.651 3.091 2.917 
Saturated model 2.960 2.960 2.960 3.252 
Independence model 25.770 24.935 26.622 25.787 
HOELTER 
Model HOELTER .05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 220 230 
Independence model 23 24 
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Appendix I 
 
Measurement Model Validation during CFA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CR AVE MSV AB SE PSE ISKS PSUS ISE GN SMC AM  
AB 0.806 0.585 0.446 0.765                  
SE 0.893 0.626 0.162 0.403 0.792                
PSE 0.956 0.846 0.127 0.282 0.037 0.920              
ISKS 0.881 0.656 0.211 0.348 0.168 0.191 0.810            
PSUS 0.867 0.626 0.269 0.476 -0.028 0.291 0.206 0.791          
ISE 0.813 0.525 0.283 0.361 0.081 0.200 0.068 0.519 0.725        
GN 0.868 0.692 0.146 0.382 0.268 0.115 0.361 0.198 0.154 0.832      
SMC 0.776 0.540 0.283 0.282 0.071 0.194 -0.066 0.465 0.532 0.150 0.735    
AM 0.932 0.823 0.446 0.668 0.230 0.357 0.459 0.382 0.290 0.379 0.217 0.907  
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Appendix J 
 
Structural Model for Professional Virtual Community Technology Threat 
Avoidance Model (PVCTTAM) 
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Appendix K  
Model Fit Summary for Structural Model 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 103 915.130 458 .000 1.998 
Saturated model 561 .000 0   
Independence model 33 9700.910 528 .000 18.373 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .079 .874 .846 .714 
Saturated model .000 1.000   
Independence model .377 .272 .226 .256 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model NFI Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 CFI 
Default model .906 .891 .951 .943 .950 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .867 .786 .824 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 457.130 374.814 547.220 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 9172.910 8856.543 9495.674 
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FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 2.415 1.206 .989 1.444 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 25.596 24.203 23.368 25.055 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .051 .046 .056 .321 
Independence model .214 .210 .218 .000 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 1121.130 1141.432 1526.968 1629.968 
Saturated model 1122.000 1232.574 3332.436 3893.436 
Independence model 9766.910 9773.414 9896.936 9929.936 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 2.958 2.741 3.196 3.012 
Saturated model 2.960 2.960 2.960 3.252 
Independence model 25.770 24.935 26.622 25.787 
HOELTER 
Model HOELTER .05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 211 221 
Independence model 23 24 
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Appendix L  
 
Comparison of CFA and Structural Model Fit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Metric 
Indices 
Acceptable 
value 
Structural 
Model Fit 
CFA Model  
Chi-square 
(χ2) 
 
 
 
Chi-
square/df 
915.130 
 458 
 
≤ 3.00 
 
 
 
 
1.998 
868.096 
453 
0.000 
1.916 
Absolute Fit 
Measures 
RMSEA  
  
RMR 
SRMR 
 
≤ 0.06 
 
≤ 1.00 
≤ 0.08 
0.051 
 
0.075 
0.654 
0.491 
 
0.070 
0.654 
Incremental 
Fit Indices 
CFI 
NFI 
IFI 
≥ 0.95 
≥ 0.90 
≥ 0.90 
 
0.950 
0.906 
0.951 
0.955 
0.911 
0.955 
 
Parsimony 
Fit Indices 
AGFI 
  
≥ 0.80 0.874 0.849 
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Appendix M 
Comparison of CFA and Structural Model Factor Loadings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructs Items CFA Factor 
Loadings 
Structural 
Model 
Self-Efficacy (SE) SE1 .700 .700 
SE2 .786 .784 
SE3 .809 .804 
SE4 .870 .872 
SE5  .784 787 
Safeguarding Measure 
Cost (SMC)  
SMC1 .601 .600 
SMC2 .775 .772 
SMC3  .812 .815 
Perceived 
Susceptibility 
(PSUS)  
PSU1 .845 .824 
PSU2 .798 .823 
PSU3 .893 .867 
PSU4  .583 .611 
Perceived Severity 
(PSE) 
PSE1 .866 .866 
PSE2 .908 .908 
PSE3 .974 .974 
PSE4 .927 .927 
Information Security 
Knowledge Sharing  
(ISKS) 
ISKS1 .925 .925 
ISKS2 .931 .930 
ISKS3 .683 .685 
ISKS4 .641 .661 
Information Security 
Experience (ISE) 
ISE1 .649 .728 
ISE2 .732 .633 
ISE3 .741 .700 
ISE4 .856 .756 
Group Norms (GN) GN1 .849 .846 
GN2 .958 .961 
GN3 .661 .659 
Avoidance Motivation 
(AM) 
 
 
Avoidance Behavior 
(AB) 
AM1 .938 .940 
AM2 .989 .986 
AM3 .781 .783 
AB2 .613 .606 
AB3 .824 .815 
AB4 .836 .830 
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